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ABSTRACT
This project further elucidates the ability that the Biblical text has of being used as a justification
for immoral actions. By using a textualist approach, we find that analyzing the effects that the
literal text could have if used to justify action, allows us to see what Scriptural-based morality is
subject to at all times. We approach this matter by classifying Scriptural interpretations under a
spectrum that varies by degree. This is useful to see that the lowest bar for an action to be
theologically justifiable, is whether it is in accordance with a literal reading of the Biblical text.
On this thesis, we investigate three categories of what we contend to be immoral actions that,
according to a textualist approach, the Bible deems either permissible, commanded by God, or
not condemned in the Biblical text.
Our approach comes as a tentative to show what the aggregate of Christian believers can
be and are subjected to because of the entailments of Christianity and the Bible being marketed
as the sacred word of God. We do not aim to constrain this discussion merely to the standpoint of
scholars, academics, and theologians. Rather, our exegetical approach is useful for engaging into
a discussion of what the lay person or believer can plausibly derive from the Scriptural text. The
standpoint we are concerned with is the standpoint of the masses, as this is the standpoint of the
overwhelming aggregate of Christian believers and/or biblical theists.
By highlighting the Biblical prescriptions on slavery and racism, women’s status and
sexual immorality, and categorical harm, we hope to show the most glaring instances in which
the Biblical text can, undeniably, be coherent theological defenses for one’s engagement in
certain immoral actions. Via the described means, we wish to expose that Biblical-based
morality can be dangerous, and coherently so. With this, our goal is to underscore that it should
not be permissible for Scripture to be advertised as an acceptable moral guide for society.
2

“As it became more widespread, Christianity not only failed to regenerate the souls of all the
people, but itself degenerated, became materialistic and bureaucratic; from the practice of
fraternal teaching one of another it changed into papalism, from wandering beggary into
monastic parasitism; in short, not only did Christianity fail to subject to itself the social
conditions of the milieu in which it spread, but it was itself subjected by them.”
– Leon Trotsky
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INTRODUCTION
The argument for religious morality mostly suggests that its followers have some moral
or epistemic advantages in contrast to non-believers (Hitchens 32). If we consider the Christian
religion, the epistemic supposition asserts that the divine Scripture is helpful in allowing people
to identify true morality as opposed to non-believers who neither follow nor recognize the
Scripture’s moral authority. Morally speaking, religion entails motivational aspects, a) the
existence of a divine entity responsible for policing, punishing, and rewarding behaviors, and b)
the very relationships with the divine tend to generate feelings and emotions that motivate action.
This incentive, thus, would predispose religious believers and followers to display a moral
behavior. Due to this motivational aspect, the dovetailing claim is that followers of religiousbased morality actually act more morally than non-believers. I will argue that, analyzing
Christianity, Biblical-based morality not only fails in the motivational aspects but also in the
epistemic one.
While every religion has different moral precepts, this paper will focus on the biblical
morality system, that is, morality that is derived directly from Scripture. We choose Christianity,
not because it has some intrinsic greater evil than other religions, but merely because we find it
to be one a relevant case study. We emphasize, however, that religion in itself is categorically
different than other guiding moral principles. The characteristics that belong to religion, such as
its categoricity of commands and its insulation from evidence differentiate it from any other
guiding belief or principle (Leiter 34). Specifically, the categoricity of commands, which
interlocks with afterlife punishment or reward delineates the special character of religion and of
action derived from its guiding principles, as “demands must be satisfied no matter what an
individual antecedent desires and no matter what incentives or disincentives the world offers up
[emphasis added]” (Leiter 34). As it is, it is undeniable that societies across the globe oftentimes
grant exemptions or privileges for religious claims of conscience because of this special
character – many of us agree that we don’t want to burden believers to possibly suffer eternal
punishment because of civil laws. As we saw, the categoricity of commands creates duties that
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can have both earthly and eternal consequences. Thus, we argue that the discussion of the effects
of religion as a guiding moral principle for action must be separate from matters of which belief
in doesn’t issue in this categoricity of commands that are insulated from evidence, such as e.g.,
utilitarianism as a guiding moral principle for action.
The biblical Scripture is a source of morality in two different ways – by example and by
direct instruction — and thus, many Christians market it in the Christian realm as the immutable
and absolute law of the divine authority (Dawkins 268). Theists have for long argued that divine
commandments are needed for people to act in a moral fashion, however, empirical evidence will
hardly support that. It is imperative to recognize that if it is the case that some Christians do act
virtuously, this falls short at establishing a necessary causal relationship between the religion, or
Scripture, and virtuous behavior. In addition, this paper aims at showing supporting evidence for
the claim that Christians do not act exclusively in a virtuous fashion, and in fact, have utilized
Scripture as a means to justifying killing, torturing, dispossessing, and oppressing other human
beings, in a, concerningly, theologically defensible manner (Harris 23).
In arguing that religious morality not only is unnecessary for identifying true morality,
and for acting morally, but also is itself immoral, this project will pose the issue of Christian
biblical-based morality. This includes its flaws as a proper moral guide and how immoral acts
have been done in the name of Christianity. Hence, we will build a case for why Biblical-based
morality is an unhelpful source in the search for how to act morally, culminating in the need to
make it obsolete as an acceptable moral guide, that is, it must not be permissible for societies to
allow its advertisement as a proper moral guide.
This paper will be written in opposition to the common hermeneutical moves that attempt
to make Scripture seem less discomfiting. The goal is to show that biblical morality has what I
term a loophole issue – Scripture allows contemporary readers to derive highly immoral stances
justified by biblical reference – that stems from what I term as the ‘Scriptural interpretation
spectrum’ – Scriptural interpretation is under a spectrum that contains several possibilities and
variations for interpreting the text, some leading to immoral acts, others to moral acts, all validly
5

theologically justified– due to the existence of Scriptural ambiguities and/or contradictions. Once
those have been established, our goal is to show that all across the spectrum, the lowest bar for
an action to be deemed theologically defensible is a textualist reading that conforms to the literal
text. Showing that this coherent interpretation of Scripture theologically defensibly allows for
immoral action, whereas it should have the character of a moral guide, will clarify the need for
receding biblical morality as an acceptable societal moral standard.
Biblical morality is ridden with ambiguities that allow us to derive seriously unethical
stances, and I will argue that deriving ethical stances from a book that vouches for unethical ones
is a flawed method for achieving the goal of formulating proper ethical positions. First, I will
explicate the definitions of the Abrahamic God and Providence theory, which will allow me to
clear objections on the basis of anachronism toward my Scriptural interpretation. Then, I will
define the role of the Bible according to the Church and theists and the interpretation spectrum,
which will create the basis for the coherence of the biblical interpretation presented in this
project. Further, I will explain the loophole issue that stems from the interpretation spectrum,
which will create the foundation for my main objection to biblical morality.
It is important to distinguish the two arguments which I will respond to as each will
require different replies: first, that the seemingly immoral prescriptions in the Bible only assume
this shape due to an exegetical error on our part. Second, that what the Bible portrays as
(im)moral is so because biblical morality is in itself superior to other moral systems. In addition,
I will analyze Scripture under three main categories of questionable moral prescriptions: slavery,
women and sexual immorality, and categorical harm, which will exemplify how biblical moral
precepts set precedent for immoral behavior by showing the disparate ways in which it has been
and can be used to justify moral and immoral actions.
Through these mechanisms, I will argue for the obsolescence of biblical-based morality
due to its lethality when it creates a theological defense for immoral behavior. If my account of
the interpretation spectrum and the loophole issue is accepted, we should not allow society,
especially laymen, to have a tool for acting immorally. This means that it should not be
6

acceptable that the Bible be advertised as a moral guide. Civil society should endorse a new
standard for morality – one that is independent of divine Scripture or commands.

7

BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION
Before going any further I must address the type of biblical interpretation chosen for this
project. First, let’s use a hypothetical example to consider the common scenario that concerns
this project: the laymen’s standpoint. Z lives in a modest community where attending church is
part of the daily life of her community. Religion is a big thing in Z’s life, born and raised
Christian, her individual experiences indicate the veracity of her beliefs. An avid churchgoer, she
always heard attentively the preaching on the sacredness of the word of the divine savior. Her
first Bible taught her, “The Bible is God’s personal Word to us. (…) Because God is always
good and truthful, his written Word, the Bible, is worthy of our complete confidence and trust.”
(English Standard Version 7). She would never forget her favorite passage from Deuteronomy
4:2 “You shall not add to the word which I am commanding you, nor take away from it”. 2
Timothy 3:16 asserts, “All Scripture is breathed out by God, and profitable for teaching (…) and
for training in righteousness”, informing Z’s biblical theism – the belief in the Bible as divinely
inspired – and her faith in those being God’s sacred and unchangeable word. To receive afterlife
reward, she “must obey God rather than man” (Acts. 5.29) – follow the prescriptions laid out in
the one book that contained God’s posited commandments.
Her morality views follow directly from biblical commandments, which represents the
word of God, in her view. Reading the Bible allows Z to understand how to be a good person
because she believes that God’s commands are directly related to her earthly moral obligations.
Z heard multiple times during mass that God is perfect and immutable, confirming that she does
well by following biblical moral prescriptions, as God’s morality is unchangeable (Broom 102).
Mostly, Z also understands divine command theory, and how her obligations are “grounded in
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and constituted by the commands of a good, just God who may issue occasional difficult
commands to achieve a greater good” (Copan and Flannagan 12).
It is self-evident that not everyone has the same views regarding God, the Bible, or
morality as Z. However, following Divine Providence theory, I argue that Z would have most
coherent interpretation of the Bible. Providence theory explains that God’s divine perspective is
different from human beings’ (Boethius 72). While humans see and experience time under an
earthly temporal realm, God’s perspective is timeless, seeing past, present, and future as one
eternal present (Boethius 72). That means that if the Holy Bible is indeed the true word of the
Christian God, then God has known in his Divine Providence that for millennia people would
read his sacred book in contrasting ways. Throughout different historical periods, some would
take a literal interpretation of it, some would read it loosely, and that others would choose to
believe some literal matters in the book but not others. If Divine Providence theory is true, he has
known the effect that the literal words written in the book would have on people, and that the
only source of his posited wishes on Earth is this singular book that, self-describedly contains his
words in it. With this knowledge, he chose the exact words, commandments, and parables that
would be in it for eternity. This train of thought does not, in any form, attempt at posing that we
have knowledge of God’s wants. We concur with Leibniz in that, “to know in detail the reasons
that could have moved him [God] to choose this order of the universe – to allow sins, to dispense
his saving grace in a certain way – surpasses the power of a finite mind” (5). Thus, we merely
provide that, if we consider Providence theory to be true, it is possible that the literal words in
the Bible represent God’s wants, at least in accordance to his ends of which we remain agnostic
about, and thus, plausible for people to follow it in such a manner.
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This either means that a) whatever is written in the Bible as a commandment or a moral
duty still reflects a Christian’s moral duties and expectation as followers of God, or b) that there
is no way to properly know one’s moral duties since to this date there is no other type of
evidence of another literature, monument, or appearance that displays what it is that this God is
or wants from people as a divinity besides this one book. We should consider that the evidence
strongly points to the fact that a) is the case or is more plausibly to be understood to be the case
since it is the only answer that can coherently justify the Bible being marketed as God’s sacred,
perfect, and immutable words, from the standpoint of those who do.
If God is a perfect all-knowing being that knows time differently than humans, knowing
past, present, and future in a single unity, and it is the case that what is written in the Bible
echoes God’s wishes and commandments, then it must follow that the only fair assumption to be
made, as finite-minded human beings, is a literal Biblical interpretation can illuminate believers
as to living a moral life under God. The only assumption that doesn’t extrapolate outside the
falsifiable facts is that God may really still want what is described in that book. If it weren’t the
case, then the book would be a different one, or its purpose at least wouldn’t be that of guiding
one’s life in a divinely inspired fashion. It seems that Z’s layperson biblical perspective is
entirely coherent considering the textual evidence and Providence theory. For the sake of
clarification, I will reiterate that the Christians this paper refers to are those as described under
the term “biblical theist” by Copan and Flannagan – believers in God and in the Bible as his
authoritative word – and that look at it for information to distinguish right from wrong in the
individual choices people make (141). They also believe God is an omniscient, omnipotent, and
omnipresent figure who has set his moral commandments in the Bible (Harris 21).
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Notwithstanding this analysis, we must account for the rejection of claim b), that we
cannot know what moral compass the followers of the Christian God must pursue due to the lack
of evidence of extra-biblical support for his wishes. The Catholic Church denies this on natural
law grounds and, likewise, on the grounds that the Church itself is an institution established by
God to interpret its sacred word. The Catholic Church proclaimed itself as the interpretive
authority of Scripture since it was written in such a difficult fashion (Mirus 1). The Church can
then decide what is to be taught, what interpretation is accurate, and disambiguate between the
allegorical and historical parts of the book. Truth is derived per the Holy Spirit’s intentions and
is transferred through papal infallibility and the bishops teaching alongside him (Mirus 1). This
strategy criticizes those who distort Scriptural interpretation with fundamentalist readings and
those who deny the supernatural characteristic of the book (Mirus 2). Therefore, morality
according to God can still be derived, but with the aid of the magisterium. I wish to leave this
consideration on hold for the moment, so we can later understand the implications of this factor
when the appropriate tools for doing so have been established.
I have previously claimed a point that might not be so self-evident, which is that the Bible
has immoral prescriptions. This may be seen as a failure to understand the historicity of the time
period in which the book was actually written and canonized, or as a certain imposition of
contemporary moral values to a different culture (Copan 78). Perhaps this is so because, as
humans, we cannot understand the mind of an eternal divinity, and we are in no place to judge
what is moral or immoral due to our limited point of view, our lack of Providence (Harris 49).
To the first point, I want to clarify that the only way to anachronistically interpret the
Holy Bible is to take it as anything but literal. If what we accept of God entails his perfect nature,
unchanged throughout time, and his commands create a moral obligation to his followers, then
his commandments are immutable, absolute, and most importantly, perfect (with the
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acknowledgement that the historicity of the canonization process does entail that some of the
language portrayed in the Book also follows its own time). Following this scheme, the moral
obligations put forth by God in his book are unchanging as well, regardless of the passing of
earthly temporal periods, as it is irrelevant within God’s Divine Providence realm of time. To the
second point, we must use our reason as well as our intuitions to validate the moral prescriptions
in the Bible, considering that not all humans abide it but are still affected by it (Harris 49). Even
if biblical moral prescriptions are moral to God, non-believers shouldn’t be bound by it or
blindly believe it to be moral. And if it is the case that non-believers find some prescriptions in
his book to be immoral, even if by contemporary morality standards, then this at least indicates
that it might be the case that such prescriptions are not moral at all, objectively speaking.
Now we also reach an important point. If people like Z are looking up to this book as the
divinely inspired word of their God, in which they are prescribed and commanded to perform
moral duties as to avoid eternal damnation, and there are unethical and immoral prescriptions in
this book, then we have encountered a concerning problem. If the biblical prescriptions of morals
and conduct are absolute and unchangeable, and people are reading it as such – and they are –
then some might find what I will render to be immoral in the following section, as permissible
acts that must be performed, even in contemporary times. Most concerningly, it would mean that
any change in people’s conception of what is right or wrong, and good or bad that has taken
place since God revealed his word is wrong and immoral in the eyes of the divinity. If we can
point to a realm of morality that considers the progress made with the advancement of Civil
Rights, women’s rights, and minority rights to be regress, then we have stumbled upon a type of
morality that is at least, incongruent with contemporary moral standards, and at most,
intrinsically wrong. In theory, such acknowledgment should be enough to render such kind of
morality as of little use to society, however, this view has also been met with some objections.
To conclude this section, I must underscore the utility in utilizing this criterion of
interpretation for the sake of the goals of this thesis. This approach doesn’t come as an attempt of
providing the correct, or the one true interpretation of the Biblical text, or of God’s will. The
12

object of our critique is precisely that any truth-claim in that regard is utterly unfalsifiable. We
contend that we cannot know or infer into the mind of the divinity at our will. This is why the
various interpretations across the soon-to-be explained Scriptural interpretation spectrum are
theologically defensible – exegesis claims all across it are unfalsifiable and can be made to be
theologically defensible alongside extra-biblical methods. Thus, claiming to know what God
wants would constitute an inference into the mind of the divinity, which we claim to be absurd.
Rather, by exposing the literal side of the spectrum, in at least the three categories that we
will be analyzing, we can see passages with highly explicit textual meaning in literal readings
that individuals all across the spectrum can theologically defensibly resort to in order to justify
action or beliefs. Our aim in providing this literal reading is showing the lowest bar that must be
met for an action to be theologically justified. Anywhere in the spectrum can one still resort to
the notion that some passages are to be read as literally true or literally commanded by God and
be theologically justified in so. Instead of claiming that the literal interpretation of the Scriptural
text is the correct one, we merely expose that literal readings of certain passages can coherently
justify (immoral) behavior. We merely expose that low bar, what it entails, and how it has
shaped individuals’ actions, without claiming to have actual knowledge of God’s wants.

13

THE SCRIPTURAL INTERPRETATION SPECTRUM
Clearly, not every Christian identifies with Z on religion itself or biblical writings. This
actualizes itself because people interpret the Bible in several different ways, from laymen to
scholars, from Catholics to Protestants. I want to introduce what I have termed as the ‘Scriptural
interpretation spectrum’. When we consider how the Bible has been interpreted since its
rudimentary form, to its canonized structure, throughout time, among different people, different
cultures, and different branches of Christianity, we see it has been met with an expansive array of
interpretations. I think it to be more useful to see these disparate views within a spectrum.
At one far end of the spectrum, we find fundamentalist interpreters that have a strictly
literal interpretation of the Bible – exactly what is written in there reflects God’s wishes and
commandments. On the opposite end of the spectrum, we find loose- or non-interpreters – those
who barely recognize Scripture to have any value worth interpreting, and that don’t see its
connection with general life, giving it no interpretive value other than strictly allegorical. In
between those far ends, we find the most populated area of the spectrum, the cherry-picking
middle. In this middle you find interpreters that cherry-pick, or more accurately, that subjectively
distinguish in one’s own interpretation what should be understood as literal from what is to be
seen as allegorical, deriving from this arbitrariness truth about the book’s action-related
commandments. The closer one’s interpretation is to literal, the closer they are to the literal end
of the spectrum. The closer one’s interpretation is allegorical, the close they are to the allegory
side. The more one picks and chooses according to one’s whims what is to be taken literally than
allegorically, the more one finds oneself in the middle of the ‘Scriptural interpretation spectrum’.
When it comes to Scriptural interpretations, we have a wide range of possibilities that can
be theologically defensible manners of interpretation. However, I have argued that the most
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coherent interpretation will find itself in the literal end of the spectrum per Divine Providence
theory. Any interpretation that is not literal, needs external factors and influences in order to
extract any truth from it. I want to explore an analogy that might exemplify this easier. W tells X:
“I am so angry that you stole my car, I will kill you” because W and X are friends, X knows W’s
character display, his past actions, how W speaks, what kinds of metaphors and expressions W
uses. Thus, X interprets W’s utterance as a joke, rather than literally—that X might be in a lifethreatening danger. X used external factors– previous knowledge and experience— in his
interpretation of the utterance to accurately derive the correct interpretation of what has been
said. As Nicholas Wolterstorff claims, unless there is good reason otherwise, an interpreter
accepts some piece of discourse to accurately represent whatever discourse is being appropriated
(qtd. In Copan and Flannagan 29).
If X and W are complete strangers, and X has no external factors that would rationally
complement his interpretation, X has no reason to assume that what has been said wasn’t meant
literally. X might wish that it wasn’t meant literally, and thus choose not to interpret it that way,
but without any explicit reason, guidance, or external factors that point to the fact that X
shouldn’t derive a literal interpretation, doing so would be unwarranted wishful thinking, at best.
Without a concrete reason to assume that W doesn’t truly mean to threaten X’s life, assuming so
goes beyond the set of facts in the scenario, hence, opening the door to any kind of interpretation
of the utterance. The interpretation that W’s statement was a joke or that W’s statement was a
metaphor, irony, a warning, or an expression of someone else’s wishes, all have the same value,
because they are all interpretations that required external factors that subjectively represent one’s
preferred interpretation of the utterance. Subjectively because once you open the door to external
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factors, each factor can be or not used as a plausible one to ground one’s interpretation, as each
factor will display a subjective relationship to the interpreter in contrast to others.
The interpretation that what has been said expresses irony is completely different than the
one that derives literal truth from it, and both are equally different from the interpretation that the
utterance, for example, signified someone else’s wishes. One of those interpretations – where
irony is derived – is better for the listener, than the one in which there is still a threat to X’s life.
But to derive one or the other is subjective and goes beyond the facts that allow X to coherently
comprehend the utterance. Hearing “I will kill you” with no context whatsoever, no facts about
the person, no contextual tone or sensations that would lead one to derive a non-literal meaning,
the only coherent interpretation of the facts that doesn’t extrapolate them in a fickle way, is the
literal one. With no facts that point against the fact that W is telling X their life is in danger, one
can only reasonably take into account what has been said in order to derive its true meaning.
Likewise, from centuries of the Christian tradition, many have gone outside the literal
words of the Bible in order to interpret it. Precisely because, as the motivational character of
Christianity implies, believers do not perceive God as a stranger. Christians perceive their
relationship to God as an intimate one, which informs their interpretation of God’s wishes. This
doesn’t circumvent the subjectiveness in interpretations that stem from this relational view. If
anything, this scenario highlights the instability in this kind of exegesis. While one believer may
derive, from one’s own understanding of their intimate relationship with God, that he has
prescribed a certain moral duty, another believer may derive the completely oppositional moral
duty based on their own intimate relationship with the divinity. Even if one doesn’t perceive God
as a stranger, and believes they have plausible evidence for grounding a particular moral duty

16

over the other, the claim is nevertheless unfalsifiable and its truth value cannot be distinguished,
objectively speaking.
Many passages, however, don’t warrant an extra-biblical interpretation due to their clarity
in meaning. For example, in Psalm 53:1 we find “The fool says in his heart, ‘There is no God.’
They are corrupt, doing abominable iniquity; there is none who does good.”, which makes it
fairly clear that those who deny the existence of God are wicked immoral people. Any
interpretation that attempts to deviate from that – as by saying that this refers only to the people
at that time, and that God doesn’t really think everyone who doesn’t believe in him is wicked – is
going outside of the text, beyond the facts that we have, to make the text less discomfiting.
Hence, one could derive any sort of interpretation from the text as one desires. Yet, the only
interpretation that doesn’t subjectively extrapolate the text is the one that non-believers are
wicked for the divinity. This can be applied across the entirety of the Holy Bible, showing that
any passage can be interpreted according to one’s whims, if not taken literally, which is subject
to contradictions and blatant falsity. As Copan explains, one can put troubling passages in the
Bible in a proper perspective by choosing where to derive one’s interpretation (339).
On that note, I will show that the acceptance of ‘moderate’ biblical-based morality is an
open invitation to fundamentalist likewise-based morality. It not only allows for people to choose
their interpretations, but it allows them to choose immoral interpretations of the Bible that have
empirical dangerous consequences. This is what I term the loophole issue. The Scriptural
interpretation spectrum shows how contemporary readers may derive very differing and, at
times, opposing interpretations of the entire book, or of specific passages. The loophole issue
comes to play when some of these interpretations allow for theologically defensible
interpretations that lead to the propagation of immoral behavior. People in the ‘pick-and-choose’
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middle-ground adopt, whimsically, what the actual moral prescriptions are and what is merely
allegorical, but it’s a personal decision. Contrarily, some people take passages literally, which
opens the door to performing atrocious behavior that is also justified by Scripture (Dawkins
269).
One person may read Deuteronomy 13:6-10 literally and derive that it is morally
permissible to slaughter family members that e.g. invite you to go to a non-Catholic place of
worship. One may also read the same passage and derive, subjectively, that the passage only
refers to something that should be done in the past, or that “You shall stone him to death with
stones” is just metaphorical (Deut. 13.10). Nonetheless, one of these is clearly immoral as it
involves murder on the grounds of religious intolerance, and I will attempt to show further
exemplification of cases where this loophole issue arises in the following sections.
Still, it is important to point out that picking and choosing morality in the Bible indicates
that the criterion for morality may absolutely stem from Scripture, and is somewhat available to
all people, religious or not (Dawkins 269). Many come to the defense of the ‘pick-and-choose’
middle-ground because the contemporary times are radically different from the Ancient Near
East, and this period difference calls for changing the application of Biblical moral truths.
However, our intuitions may point to the implausibility of an all-knowing God not having taught
fundamental moral truths to his chosen people from the beginning of his covenant (Bergmann et
al. 101). We will deal with this matter in what follows.

18

THE MORAL DEVELOPMENT OBJECTION
It could be the case that the divine teachings were not precise from its inception because
God’s commandments are to be seen as analogous to the relationship between parents and
children, where we find parents teaching certain things to children in accordance with their
development (Bergmann et al. 146). Nevertheless, such objection appears to be the result of a
faulty analogy. When it comes to teaching someone in relation to their development, picture the
following scenario: a child steals from their friends in school and comes home with stolen
pencils. Just because she is a child doesn’t mean that the parents should, or would, say something
to the effect of “you can only steal from us, not from your friends at school”. That would
certainly teach the kid that stealing is not outright wrong, or else it would be definitively
impermissible. Parents do in fact teach kids not to steal because of the relation to one’s
development. If right from wrong isn’t taught when wrong actions take place, the action might
become a habit, and if it already is a habit, then the teaching needs to be even clearer, stricter,
and precise.
There is little reason to assume that an omnipotent God was unable to teach Israelites
morally right from wrong, discarding impotency as a reason. The Israelite’s moral stance might
have been one inferior to contemporary times, but nothing points to the fact that a divine
commandment wouldn’t lead to practical change. Even so, much that was taught did transcend
their time, so it wouldn’t be implausible for the divinity to add a few more lines on more
pressing issues that would also not be easily accepted at first. While parents may be unable to
change their children’s mindset, and children might oppose the moral teachings, not acting by
them, parents still teach right from wrong – which, I must admit, can be context-dependent. God
then, either did teach right from wrong and such is exemplified in Scripture, leading to
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problematic literal interpretations, or he did not teach the entirety of morality, leaving people to
work it out themselves as time goes by, which can also lead to problematic arbitrary
interpretations and nevertheless allows for one’s ability to still resort to the fundamentalist
reading. I am in no way asserting that God did either one of the other. The crucial matter is that
either way, the loophole issue arises, which indicates the impracticability of such a moral system.
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THE CATHOLIC CHURCH’S INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY POSSIBILITY
It is necessary for me to go into a discussion of how the Catholic Church’s teachings fit
into this schema. We can now return to the consideration regarding the Church’s interpretive
authority. This maneuver is a great exemplification of the contradictions that the Scriptural
interpretation spectrum can subject us to. The Catholic Church deems itself as the interpretive
authority of the Bible, justifying such by claiming Scriptural evidence for God’s desire to have
such an institution able to disambiguate complicated passages of his Holy Book, as well as the
Tradition of apostolic succession. It discourages a merely literal reading of the text, further
relying in the Church’s ability to discern what the correct interpretation of different passages are.
The first thing we must address is the claim that the Church’s interpretive authority is
warranted through Scripture. As the Vatican claims, “Scripture itself bears witness to Tradition
and gives evidence of the Magisterium in that it recalls the teaching of the apostles” (“Catholic
Teaching” 2). Several different biblical passages have been considered to substantiate the
apostolic succession claim, as Matt. 16:18-19, “(…) I will give you [Peter] the keys of the
kingdom of heaven, and whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven”, or Matt. 28:1820 where Jesus tells his disciples to “go (…) make disciples of all nations, (…) teaching them to
observe all that I have commanded you”. At the same time, we can see that Protestants, for
example, have pointed at other verses to justify the exact opposite position, such as Acts 17:11,
“Now these Jews were more noble (…), examining the Scriptures daily to see if these things
were so.”, or 1 John 2:27, “But the anointing that you received from him abides in you, and you
have no need that anyone should teach you”. This in itself does not indicate that one or the other
is more or less accurate, but it does indicate that both cannot be true at the same time.
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We must note that the Church’s claim in itself is only possible because of its own
interpretation of the Bible, thus, the argument circularly begs its own question. We have three
aspects that predicate the Church’s authority in discerning “God’s word and will”: first, the “two
swords” theory that asserts the Pope’s role as earthly vicar of Jesus, who granted him full
authority (Witte and Nichols 13-14). Second, the “keys of the kingdom of heaven” theory that
derives that Christ delegated popes with a “key of knowledge” for identifying God’s will (Witte
and Nichols 14). Third, the Church’s Traditional Authority over Christian sacraments (Witte and
Nichols 14). The first two aspects illuminate our claim in that the “two swords” theory is derived
from an interpretation of the Scriptural text under Luke 22:38 and the “the keys of the kingdom
of heaven theory” from the abovementioned passage under Matthew 16:18 (Witte and Nichols
13-14). As the Vatican illustrates, “(...) any interpretation of Scripture that regards it as inspired
and therefore normative for all ages is necessarily an interpretation that takes place within the
Church’s Tradition, which recognizes Scripture as inspired and normative” (Catholic Teaching
1).
If the reason why the Church claims its interpretive authority, including the possibility of
the apostolic succession is due to its own interpretation of certain verses, and such interpretation
leads to supporting its interpretive authority, then this interpretive authority claim has the same
value as any other claim for interpretive authority. The Church interprets the text, its
interpretation says there needs to be a church to fulfill the role of the interpretive authority, thus,
they claim interpretive authority based on their initial interpretation that they are the ones
expected to fulfill such a role. Further, they interpret the sacred text to have rendered Peter with
apostolic succession. This has the same value as if the case was that Protestants interpreted the
text and the interpretation derived that they were the interpretive authority, thus they have
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interpretive authority following from their own interpretation. Do we have any reason to say one
or the other is correct? I find it hard to say so, at least on these grounds.
The claim for one kind of interpretation or the other is extra-biblical, inferring into the
mind of a divinity, resulting in the very same things that the Catholic Church criticizes others for
doing. The only difference is that in the Catholic Church case, their interpretation established
their authority among that section of believers, and the majority of them are following it. The
Catholic Church claims that there are lots of ways of interpreting a text, especially a divinely
inspired one, so there needs to be an authority. However, if the supposed authority just chooses
one kind of interpretation to warrant it, that authority is unwarranted. Not that my goal is to
reject the probability that there could be an interpretive authority, but taking the Church’s
authority for granted based on an interpretation that justifies itself, is giving in to a fallacious
argument that not only begs its own question but can be subject to intense contradictions.
The Church holds that the Bible is divinely inspired especially on matters regarding
morality (“On the Inspiration of Scripture”). It points to the Gospels as the true instruction for
morals, but because of the complexity of the book, regular individuals are not suited to derive a
truthful interpretation (“On the Inspiration of Scripture”). This points back to the previous
discussion of how people can wrongly interpret what is to be taken as allegorical or literal truth,
or how to distinguish ephemeral teachings from obligations. In order to avoid this, the Church
identifies itself as the infallible interpreter of the divinely inspired truths in the Bible (“On the
Inspiration of Scripture”). An example of the contradictions that this kind of interpretation is
open to is when we look at papal infallibility.
The Pope, as the head of the Church, holds infallible authority on biblical interpretations.
This infallibility entails the “exemption from the possibility of error” (“True Meaning of
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Infallibility”). Now, if we analyze history, we can see that popes and bishops across time have
vouched for extremely immoral positions. Pope Nicholas V wrote Dum Diversas, the pro-slavery
document that authorized the Portuguese capture and enslavement of pagans and Saracens
(Shermer 194). The document was reiterated and renewed by following Popes for almost thirty
years, only to be partially revoked almost a hundred years later with Paul III’s Sublimus Dei. The
full revocation only came over 400 years later with Pope Leo XII.
In more modern times, Pope Pius XI was not only complicit with the rise of fascism in
Italy, but he also described Mussolini as a “man sent by Providence” (Hitchens 235). Pius XI
also ratified the Lateran Pact, gaining territorial sovereignty and moral educational monopoly for
the sake of supporting Mussolini’s fascist administration (Hitchens 235). But this wasn’t the only
fascist government that had the magisterium’s avowal. Hitler’s administration's first treaty was
with the Vatican itself. In exchanging educational control for silence in the face of a threat
against human lives, even Parish records were made available for Hitler’s administration to judge
racial purity (Hitchens 238). Not only this, but papal instruction led to the annual celebration of
Hitler’s birthday. Moreover, Pope Pius XII sent Hitler a letter containing the Church’s
continuous efforts for devotion in the Fuhrer’s leadership (Hitchens 239). Shouldn’t we then
conclude that the Catholic Church has infallibly deemed immoral acts as theologically
defensible? We shall return to this question.
Before going down this route, we need to acknowledge that the Church doesn’t claim
infallibility to every single act of the Pope, but rather, only to teachings that can be properly
considered ex cathedra (Toner). For a papal teaching to be considered ex cathedra, it needs to
fulfill some requirements. The teaching needs to be done publicly and be done in one’s capacity
as a member of the Church, rather than as a private individual. Not only that, but the teaching
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needs to be related to faith or morals in order for it to be considered infallible. The teaching
needs to be done with ‘defining intention’, that is, the intention of the teaching must be that it is
representing his clerical authority in determining the irrevocability of such doctrine. Lastly, for a
teaching to be considered ex cathedra, the Pope needs to intend to “bind the whole Church”, or
else it won’t be considered infallible (Toner 16).
This allows for comprehending the seemingly immoral papal complicity we previously
saw. It is not the case that Catholics are supposed to deem Hitler as a divine gift, or to deem
enslavement rightly for infidels, because those were never infallible teachings in the first place.
Moreover, it is also not the case that the Church doesn’t have definitive teachings, but it is the
case that the Church claims to accompany the development in the secular world, which allows
for fully playing their role as the interpretive authority (Toner). In fact, the Church points to at
least three infallible teachings: the doctrine of infallibility itself, Mary’s Immaculate Conception
and her Assumption (Toner). Even though I could argue that at least Pope Nicholas V and Pope
Pius XI’s acts fulfill the requirements for being ex cathedra teachings, such is beside the point. It
is clear that the Church’s strategy is susceptible to contradictions when it becomes possible for
certain Popes to place the Church in a slavery-supporting role for centuries, and also have Popes
placing the Church in the abolitionist role, but neither be a definite infallible stance on the issue.
If we are not to deem the aforementioned seemingly immoral teachings to be infallible, as
they are not, by the same token, we know that all other teachings for more moral things e.g. later
papal oppositions to slavery, are also not to be deemed infallible, as they are not per the Church’s
own teachings. One may argue that even if fallible, the latest teachings can be deemed more
coherent to the core principles of the Church than the earlier and more problematic teachings.
Although this can be a useful strategy for followers to disambiguate moral from immoral claims,
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it doesn’t change the fact that the Catholic Church has not yet placed a definite interpretive
authority via ex cathedra teachings on several immoral Biblical issues, which allows for the
loophole issue to arise. If the Church hasn’t presented a definite infallible stance on certain
matters yet, one can still act upon these issues based on which past papal teaching one prefers.
This allows Catholics to perform immoral actions that have been avowed by the Catholic Church
in the past, even if not infallibly, since there isn’t a definite opposition to it by the supposed
Church authority. The Church’s authority has not issued infallible teachings regarding many
moral issues, and this silence allows for the issues with the Scriptural interpretationsSpectrum to
arise. The loophole issue comes not necessarily regarding Catholics cherry-picking Bible
passages, but Catholics cherry-picking the Church’s non-infallible teachings as one pleases as
well as the Church’s representatives having cherry-picked what the Bible signifies or not at
different times. The church’s maneuver of establishing itself as the authority is a smart one, but
not an unfailing one. This scheme is still prone to contradictions, allowing immoral behavior to
be performed with a theologically defensible justification.

26

BIBLICAL MORALITY
Before we go into a discussion of the immoralities in the Bible, I want to give a brief
analysis of arguments for it. First, let’s assess the claim that the immoral prescriptions in the
Bible are only seemingly immoral due to an exegetical error. The claim is that Moses’
commandments and Old Testament Law reflect a moral improvement in relation to other nations
in the ancient Near East in the social context of warfare as a means for survival (Copan 84, 138,
287). Thus, throughout time, God aimed at the moral improvement of his people by portraying
“his redemptive purposes” despite Israelite’s then-current inferior moral condition (Copan 84).
God had to settle for not being explicit about the epitome of morality while still desiring
improvement pointing people towards the true ideal of morality (PC 84, 224). The only reason
why it would look like certain prescriptions are immoral is due to a failure in understanding this
context. However, not only does this argument neglects to account for the possibility of the New
Testament’s immoral character, but also, besides Jesus’ teachings on divorce, at no other point
can we definitely say that God indicated his ‘settlement for less’ or what any moral improvement
would look like outside Scriptural prescriptions, and assuming such, although comforting, is not
sufficient evidence for the case.
In the same light, at no point are the readers directed to understanding ‘the ideal’, and the
book is often sought for containing the ideal itself. In the least, the book presents itself as
ambiguous regarding what the ideal is. Moreover, the Bible includes extensive sections with
quite insignificant pieces of information (morally speaking) – chapters giving proper dimensions
for building a temple – while failing to disambiguate between subjects of vital importance, for
example, giving a definite judgement on slavery (Conner 82).
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Another argument arises from this line of questioning, which is that what is portrayed as
moral or immoral in the Bible really is moral or immoral because such is stated in the Bible. This
stems from the idea that God cannot be contradictory, and since his nature is that of goodness, he
cannot also have an evil nature (Broom 103). Hence, his commandments cannot be evil, or better
said, his moral prescriptions cannot be immoral. As an attempt to solve the Euthyphro dilemma,
this argument asserts that morality, objectively speaking, is based on God’s perfect and
unalterable nature (Broom 104). Thus, this line of thinking maintains that in rejecting God’s
moral standard, we would be judging him by his own moral standard, thus, validating it (Broom
113). But to claim that there is such a thing as an objective divinely-based morality without a
serious attempt to substantiate the claim is meaningless. I contend that we judge the Biblical
morality by our human moral standards. In summation, it is not the case that morality is
necessarily directly and correctly derived from the Bible, but by our intuitions of right and wrong
when faced with moral questions. Either way, we find that there is insufficient evidence to the
claim that the pious is only pious because God loves it.

28

THE IMMORALITIES IN THE BIBLE
With all of this into consideration, we can analyze different passages in the Bible that are,
at minimum, seemingly immoral, to show the danger that biblical-derived morality poses to
society. To do so, I will discuss three different categories of prescriptions: those relating to
slavery, women and sexuality, and categorical harm. The goal of the following discussion is to
show that abiding by biblical moral prescriptions allows for the theological avowal of heinous
acts, which overweighs any good that may come from it. By analyzing different viewpoints
within the interpretation spectrum, we intend to provide a holistic view, but will nevertheless
take the literal side for the aforementioned coherence concerns and for the purposes of
elucidating the lowest bar to be met for that an action be theologically defensible.
1. SLAVERY
Many credit Christianity for the abolition of slavery or at least for the moral progress in
condemning such institution. This has been intensively challenged by the notion that Christianity
had a driving role in the institution of slavery. In this section, my aim is two-tiered. First, to show
how Christian institutions, authorities, and followers have, at times, assumed a supporting role to
the enslavement of human beings. Second, to demonstrate that this role was assumed due to the
loophole issue, in this case, that following biblical precepts on the matter has and can still lead to
pro-slavery and racist stances that are, at the same time, coherent with Scripture.
To begin this quest, we should look at what the historical evidence shows. Slavery has been a
ubiquitous practice, taking different forms wherever it arose. Although the history of slavery can
be dated back to the Ancient Near East, derived from war policies, the undeniable peak in chattel
slavery took place in the beginning of the 17th century, in the form of the Transatlantic Slave
Trade. Currently, in hindsight, many point out to the positive effect that the rise of Christianity in
the antiquity had on this practice (Bradley and Cartledge. 2). Others, however, point out
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Christianity’s role in “(…) reinforc[ing], not to challeng[ing], traditional social structures”
(Bradley, and Cartledge 2). The pervasiveness and normalization of the practice for most of
history indicated that “Christianity did not make a difference to slavery in antiquity” (Bradley
and Cartledge 2). Christianity may not have created chattel slavery or been the only social
institution that endorsed it, but in the peak of the practice, Christianity did have a role in its
propagation, and it wasn’t always of ameliorating it.
Scholars have indicated that Latin America’s slavery wasn’t as tough as slavery in the
English America because of the Catholic Church’s influence in the former, while others render
this a myth (Nascimento 62). The institution of slavery lasted its longest in the Portuguese
colony of Brazil, where colonization was undertaken alongside a project of expanding Catholic
doctrine in the nation. Christian missionaries aimed at converting infidels in Africa and at giving
support to the market that trafficked Black lives to South America. One example of Church
officials’ complacency in human enslavement can be seen through the actions of prominent
priests like Father Antônio Vieira. He would preach to the enslaved in Brazil to obey good and
evil masters alike because God had put them in the position of a slave for a reason. The narrative
asserted that slaves should be thankful for God had saved them from integrating with the socalled ‘infidels’ left in the African continent. It wasn’t the case that Catholicism led to less
dehumanization of enslaved populations, rather, in Brazil, the Catholic Church became the main
ideological anchor for the institution of slavery to its most brutal degree (Nascimento 62).
Notwithstanding, this was not unique to Catholicism or to Latin American slavery. English
Protestant Pastor Morgan Goldwin also used the same rationale in his own dealings. He preached
that Christianity had established the rightful authority of masters over servants, grounding the
enslaved’s duties to their owners – to not misbehave or resist. But most importantly, Pastor
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Goldwin used the common rhetoric that by serving one’s owner righteously, heavenly reward
would follow (Nascimento 63). Oftentimes, Christianity not only accepted but encouraged the
institution of slavery in spite of its brutality (Nascimento 63). In particular, we can see this
encouragement personified in the ante and postbellum United States, where an array of Christian
preachers of different denominations justified the maintenance of slavery with the biblical text,
e.g. Noah’s son’s curse into servitude became a basis for that attitude (Hitchens 167).
The United States saw both in the Civil War and the Civil Rights eras a similar instance.
Abraham Lincoln himself contended that both the abolitionist as well as the pro-slavery stance
were both endorsed by faith (Hitchens 178). In Dr. Martin Luther King’s time, Southern
churches blessed the institutions of segregation and discrimination (Hitchens 179). After the
World War II, emancipation talk came to the fore only to be undermined, as “discrepant
descendants of Noah were not intended by god to be mixed” (Hitchens 179). This kind of
rhetoric would still run deep, at least in the American South. The cries for desegregation were
challenged with religious discourse and Sen. Pat Robertson’s words are marked in history, “I’d
sure like to help the colored, but the Bible says I can’t [emphasis added].” (Hitchens 179).
In Bob Jones University v. United States, Genesis 10-11, Acts 17:26, Deuteronomy 32:8,
Daniel 7:13-14, Zechariah 14, Revelation 21:24 and Romans 9:19:24 were grounds for the
sincerely held belief that interracial relationships, dating or marriage, were forbidden by the
Bible – that mixing Blacks and whites was “satanic” (Drennan 572). If we also pay heed to
Numbers 12, or Deuteronomy 7:3, “you shall not intermarry with them (…) for you are a people
Holy to the Lord your God”, teaches the sin of miscegenation. As Christopher Hitchens argued,
“the chance that someone’s religious belief would cause him or her to uphold slavery and racism
was statistically extremely high” (180).
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I must point out that there is another side to this story. While it is true that some have framed
Scripture to warrant the enslavement of others, many have done otherwise. On the one hand we
have seen figures like Muhammad Ali, basing his religious conversion on the white-supremacist
character of Christianity i.e. its role in the enslavement of his ancestors, or Fredrick Douglass’
view that the most devout Christian made the most savage slaveowner. On the other hand, other
prominent figures like Martin Luther King Jr. advocated for the Civil Rights movement using
biblical references. He saw that God freed his people from a life of servitude in Egypt –one of
the warrants that Christianity opposed such a condition (Hitchens 174).
The Scripturally derived pro-slavery and the abolitionist stances are contradictory. This
contradiction may stem either from an exegetical problem that leads to a failed interpretation of
the true meaning of the text, or the problem is one of arbitrariness: cherry-picking instances that
more conveniently support one’s opinion. This issue can also be understood as a matter of a
failure of imagination in the Church’s teachings. The lack of infallible teachings on this matter,
as exposed in the previous section, amounts to one of the reasons that individuals can derive
contradictory views on the same subject, based on the same biblical foundation. While one may
argue that the Church has not explicitly and/or infallibly endorsed slavery, this does not impact
the position I am arguing for. The subject of my concern here, is rather, that the Church has not,
as one of their infallible teachings, condemned slavery. Whether it failed to regard this matter as
an important one, or one that requires an infallible teaching, slavery was never denounced as an
immoral act by the institution in the same way it had issued infallible teachings on other matters,
i.e., the Assumption or the Conception.
But the real question becomes: is it the case that pro-slavery stances have been coherently
derived from biblical Scripture? In other words, have those who derived a pro-slavery stance
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from Scripture done so in a theologically defensible way? If this happens to be the case, whether
it is possible for one to also derive an abolitionist stance out of it becomes superfluous – the
biblical text can present a theological defensible stance for slavery. If such, we will have
demonstrated that the notion of a Biblical guide for morals fails, at least on this matter.
In order to find the answer to this question, I think it is useful to look at what the Scriptural
text asserts. Starting with the Old Testament, a few verses explicitly enable slavery as well as the
poor treatment of slaves. To exemplify, in Exodus 21:20-21, where the laws regarding slaves are
explained, we find, “When a man strikes his slave, male or female, with a rod and the slave dies
under his hand, he shall be avenged, but if the slave survives a day or two he is not to be
avenged, for the slave is his money”. Not only is slavery upheld by this deity, but also, we find
provisions as to the amount of physical punishment a slave master is permitted to inflict upon his
slaves. If we go further, under Leviticus 25:44-46, “As for your male and female slaves whom
you may have: you may buy male and female slaves from among the nations that are around you.
You may also buy from among the strangers who sojourn with you and their clans that are with
you, who have been born in your land, and they may be your property. You may bequeath them
to your sons after you to inherit as a possession forever”. Now, we see more clearly that the
provisions regarding slavery also deal with what to do with foreigners – you’re permitted to
enslave them according to the Scriptural provisions. This narrative is coherent with
Deuteronomy 20:11, that provides that whenever arriving to a territory that you want to conquer,
upon offering peace terms, “all the people who are found in it [territory] shall do forced labor for
you and shall serve you”.
But it may be argued that looking at the Old Testament for this is an error. One must
approach the Bible holistically to see that the progressive positive change in attitude towards
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slavery and the treatment of slaves (Copan 87). It is argued that the New Testament doesn’t
display an endorsement of slavery, and that verses like Luke 4:18, show Jesus’ clear opposition
to the practice – Jesus claims to fulfill the Scripture in freeing the oppressed and the captive
(Copan 226, 229). Not only is this not an absolute repudiation of slavery, but to claim that the
New Testament does not provide instances of avowing the enslavement of individuals would be
quite disingenuous. Several books after Luke show, at minimum, a lack of opposition to the
dehumanizing practice. For instance, in Ephesians 6:5, St. Paul advises slaves to obey their
masters as they would obey Jesus Christ (New International Version). Colossians 3:22, 1
Timothy 6, and Titus 2:9 all emulate the same rhetoric – “(…) obey in everything those who are
your earthly masters”, “regard their own masters as worthy of all honor”, or “slaves are to be
submissive to their own masters in everything (…)” (NIV). While it is true that Paul’s claims
don’t necessarily endorse slavery as moral per se, the issue in hand is precisely what he doesn’t
claim – to condemn slavery and its immoral character. Further, in 1 Peter 2:18, we more
specifically understand that even under the most unjust slave master must the slave graciously
show obedience and respect, and salvation will follow (NIV).
We can now use this exposition to analyze other facts that we have in hand. As explained
previously, Father Antônio Vieira was one of the most high-profile figures in the apogee of
Portuguese colonization efforts in Latin America. His discourse on slavery obedience to good
and evil masters alike surely mirrors 1 Peter 2:18’s “(…) be subject to your masters (…) not only
to the good and gentle but also to the unjust” (ESV). Pastor Goldwin’s rhetoric that slaves
mustn’t resist or misbehave against their masters also emulates Titus 2:9’s provisions. His
sermons on how obedience is met with heavenly reward also mimics the arrangements under 1
Peter. Likewise, some Christian denominations “have been founded on the proposition that
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chattel slavery could flourish alongside the gospel of Jesus Christ” as it was divinely mandated
(Jones 1).
What appears to be the case is that pro-slavery attitudes on this matter are highly coherent
with what Scripture provides. Again, whether these attitudes were correctly or wrongly derived
from Scripture is outside of our scope – what concerns this project is whether such stance could
have been coherently derived from the Scriptural text in a theologically defensible way. Thus,
responding the crucial question of this section, it does seem that the loophole issue holds – it is
possible and plausible for individuals to derive a pro-slavery stand based on the Holy Book’s
provisions. It follows, then, that one is able to derive a theologically defensible pro-slavery
attitude, as many have, indeed. If 1) it would be sound to hold such a stance in relation to
Scripture, and 2) at least contemporarily, we acknowledge the moral impermissibility of the
practice of enslaving others, then it would follow that 3) Scripture fails as a proper moral guide
on the matter.
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2. WOMEN AND SEXUALITY
The current exposition of immoral Biblical commands also takes into the task of analyzing
the relation between prescriptions on the topic of women and sexuality and societal attitudes. I
argue that, just like the discussion on slavery, Scriptural commands have also been detrimental to
the treatment of women and of homosexual individuals and communities. First, due to the
rhetoric that displays the objectification, commodification and overall inferior status of women.
Second, by stigmatizing natural bodily processes, specifically that of menstruation. Third, by the
endorsement of sexual assault, especially against women. Finally, by condemning homosexual
relations. The contemporary discussion on these matters is very controversial, and disparate
Christian denominations have different views on the subject. The goal of this section, however,
is to show that one can in fact coherently derive a discriminatory, either misogynistic, sexist or
homophobic stance purely based on Scripture, thus, being theologically defensible.
We shall begin by looking at the biblical rhetoric that inferiorizes, objectifies and
commodifies women. Starting at the book of Genesis, women were treated as objects
undeserving of respect (Dawkins 272). God, after creating Adam, the first man in the world,
decides to “make him a helper [emphasis added] fit for him” (ESV, Gen. 2.18). After creating the
helper, that is, Eve, God explains that if a matter of contention comes in between her and Adam,
“he shall rule over you” (Gen 3.16). This indicates a kind of expectation regarding the
relationship between a husband and a wife, but what about women who are not yet married?
Well, as the descendants of Adam started to multiply themselves, men simply “took as their
wives any they chose.” (Gen. 6.2). And this objectifying relationship solidifies itself when we
see Lot giving his two daughters away to “men of Sodom”, to “do to them as you please” (Gen.
19.4,8). An important consideration to add is that later, in 2 Peter 2:7, we find that Lot is
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considered a righteous man (Conner 62). In the lead off chapter of the Holy Book, we noticed the
primary conceptions that women are to be regarded as either their father’s or their husband’s
property and/or exchange tool. A woman’s desires are not free from the constraints of her
husband, that is, as long as she wants to work towards receiving the eternal salvation from God.
In giving his Ten Commandments, god ossifies the intrinsic objectified character of
women. Commandment number ten, “(…) you shall not covet your neighbor’s wife (…)” sheds
light into how women are seen in a quasi-property status, as coveting is the desire for something
that rightfully belongs to another individual (Exod. 20.17). Women, in this sense, are seen to
rightfully belong to her husband, like his “house, or his male servant, or his female servant, or
his ox, or his donkey, or anything that is your neighbor’s.” (Exod. 20.11). Counted among other
‘lesser’ things, women are displayed as another object for possession. While this only applies to
free women, slave women are also seen as inferior to their male counterparts. While the latter
adult may be worth fifty shekels, the former, only thirty (Lev. 27).
The inferiorization of women also concerned the gender inequality in marital as well as
clerical relations. The manifold instances in which Scripture incontestably tells women to
“submit [themselves] to your own husband” clearly show the epistemic inequality between men
and women (Eph. 5.22, 24, Col. 3.18, Titus. 2.4, 1 Pet. 3.5). Additionally, Scripture doesn’t fall
short of making clear what this submission entails. A wife is to be “under her husband’s
authority”, to the degree that any vows or oaths that she commits to can be nullified on the basis
of her husband’s or father’s desire (Num. 5.29, 30.5-13). This is not, however, the only matter to
which a husband is entitled authority over his wife. Paul, in 1 Corinthians 7:4, explains to us that
“(…) the wife does not have authority over her own body, but the husband does”. But surely it
would be deceiving not to mention the following verse, that “[l]ikewise the husband does not
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have authority over his own body, but the wife does.” (1 Cor. 7.4). We might be drawn to
analyze this passage to see that it represents an equal marital standing between a husband and his
wife, but we soon realize such equal standing is illusory. Paul clarifies that, “(…) the head of
every man is Christ, the head of a wife is her husband [emphasis added]. (…) Neither was man
created for woman, but woman for man [emphasis added]” (1 Cor. 11.3, 9). Essentially, there is
a hierarchy where men are above women, who were merely created for men, as we have seen
previously, as his ‘helper’, whose thoughts and actions are under the prerogative authority of a
man, either her husband or her father.
In the ecclesiastic realm, we also see how Scripture maintains the inferior status of
women. Women are not allowed to speak in churches, they are supposed to learn quietly, and if
they need to ask questions, they can direct them to their husbands when at home (1 Cor. 14.34, 1
Tim. 2.11). Women’s professional activities are limited as they are not permitted to “teach or to
exercise authority over a man” (1 Timothy 2:12, 3). Not allowed to speak in churches, to teach or
assume any position hierarchically above a man, a woman’s job is to “respect her husband”, be
“self-controlled, pure, working at home, kind, and submissive to their own husbands” so “that
the word of God may not be reviled” (Eph. 5.23, Titus 2.4). A husband’s job in turn, is to “live
with your wives in an understanding way, showing honor to the woman as the weaker vessel
[emphasis added] (…)” (1 Peter 3:7). Intrinsically weak and submissive by obligation: this is the
view on women any layperson can clearly and distinctively derive from the Holy Bible.
Nevertheless, a woman’s nature is also ostracized. Menstruation, a natural bodily process,
is rendered a curse, an uncleanliness. Scripture is quite explicit in these matters, “When a woman
has a discharge, and the discharge in her body is blood, she shall be in her menstrual impurity for
seven days, and whoever touches her shall be unclean until the evening. And everything on
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which she lies during her menstrual impurity shall be unclean. Everything also on which she sits
shall be unclean. (…) And if any man lies with her and her menstrual impurity comes upon him,
he shall be unclean seven days, and every bed on which he lies shall be unclean.” (Lev. 15:1920, 24). This conception of menstruation as a sin has fueled the taboo many Western cultures
have cultivated around it, both in the civil and the clerical worlds.
In 1878, women were subject to social restrictions when menstruating because it was
seen as dangerous (Guterman, et al. 4). Many Catholics still hold the belief that it is prohibited to
have intercourse with a woman on her period (Guterman, et al. 4). Russian Orthodox Christians
make women live in a secluded hut while on their periods: they are prohibited from contact with
men or food, and are thought to be polluting the air around them, or of causing bad weather
(Guterman, et al. 4). Orthodox Jews, who observe the Pentateuch closely, make women take
ritual baths to cleanse themselves from the uncleanliness of menstruation (Hitchens 54). In what
it pertains to the Church, this menstrual taboo has been foundational to women’s exclusion from
authority roles in Christianity, and from receiving communion (Guterman, et al. 4). What
Gottlieb has found is that the root of the widespread of menstrual taboo notions has been the
Bible of the Jewish and Christian traditions (146). It is true, however, that not all necessarily see
menstruation as a sin or as curse, but menstruation is still dealt with as a disease, a fundamental
defect that ravages women’s bodies and psyches. It is thus inevitable to see the connection
between Scriptural prescriptions in this matter, and how it has been dealt with for millennia.
Nevertheless, the most serious Scriptural undertaking when it comes to women, is its
unequivocal toleration and, at times, endorsement of sexual assault against women. We have
already mentioned Lot’s giving away of his daughters for men to “do to them as you please”
(Gen. 19.8), which one way or another indicates the easiness of the practice. We mustn’t wonder,
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however, for God specifies his laws about social justice. In Exodus 22:16-17, the Lord tells us,
“If a man seduces a virgin who is not betrothed and lies with her, he shall give the bride-price for
her and make her his wife. If her father utterly refuses to give her to him, he shall pay money
equal to the bride-price for virgins”. Not only is her father’s consent and approval the only one
that matters, but regardless of her consent, she must marry whoever lied with her, so it may be
that she must marry her rapist. More similar situations appear across Scripture. The prescription
that, “If brothers dwell together, and one of them dies and has no son, the wife of the dead man
shall not be married outside the family to a stranger. Her husband’s brother shall go in to her
and take her as his wife and perform the duty of a husband’s brother to her. [emphasis added]”,
clearly shows how the woman has no choice, and if her husband dies, her brother-in-law will
take her as he shall in order to fulfill his duty (Deut. 25.5-10). Deuteronomy 22:28-29 emulates
this rhetoric, “if a man meets a virgin who is not betrothed, and seizes her and lies with her, and
they are found, then the man who lay with her shall give to the father of the young woman fifty
shekels of silver, and she shall be his wife, because he has violated her”.
As disheartening as it may be, a woman has to remain married to her sexual abuser, as if
that is what a victim of rape would like for themselves. In the end, a woman’s rape is her own
fault, as she is capable of crying for help, “If there is a betrothed virgin, and a man meets her in
the city and lies with her, then you shall bring them both out to the fate of that city, and you shall
stone them to death with stones, the young woman because she did not cry for help though she
was in the city, and the man because he violated his neighbor’s wife” (Deut. 22.23). The
Scripture’s narrative disproportionately burdens victims with the responsibility for not being
assaulted, interestingly, a common rhetoric to this day. Lastly, virgin women were constantly
being sought for King Ahasuerus’ harem, where they would be forced to beautify themselves for
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twelve months to be at the whims of the King, waiting for when she would be summoned to lie
with him (Esth. 2.12-14).
If free virgin women’s sexuality was another commodity irrespective of their consent,
servants and prisoners of war bore the brunt. Genesis 30:3 portrays a controversial passage
nowadays, which has inspired the teachings of certain Christian denominations, i.e. People of
Praise. In Genesis, Rachel gives Jacob her servant Bilhah so that he can have the child he desires,
and so he does. Sarah gives Hagar, her handmaid for Abraham to impregnate (Gen, 16.3). Leah
also gives Jacob her servant Zilpah to bear his son, and so she did (Gen. 30.9). Most striking is
Leah’s assertion that, “God has given me my wages because I gave my servant to my husband”,
showing that not only did she do the right thing in giving her servants out to be raped by her
husband, but God also rewarded her for it (Gen. 30.18). Another similar divine endorsement is
seen in 2 Samuel 16:20-23, where we find that Absalom rapes David’s concubines in public after
Ahithophel counsels him “as if one consulted the word of God”.
Women were also, naturally, part of war conquests, so “when you go out to war against
your enemies, and the Lord your God gives them into your hand and you take them captive, and
you see among the captives a beautiful woman, and you desire to take her to be your wife, and
you bring her home to your house (…) she shall take off the clothes in which she was captured
and shall remain in your house and lament her father and her mother a full month. After that you
may go in to her and be her husband, and she shall be your wife” (Deut. 21.10-13). Paul Copan
argues that this is a “protective measure for the women prisoners of war”, as this law aimed at
protecting her personhood, not letting her be raped (Copan 187). This absurdity can only be
thought of if one thinks that being kidnapped as a war prisoner, or that being married to your
assaulter and hijacker would be protecting one’s personhood. I find it hard to say that such could
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ever be true, unless we are using a different definition of personhood in which women’s very
own individuality as a person is nonetheless tied to a man’s whims. With the current exposition
of the facts, however, it does not seem that Scripture is anywhere close to giving a true
personhood character to women: their value is intrinsically connected to their reproduction and
their submission to husbands, fathers, or masters. Not once is a woman’s consent to sexual
intercourse mentioned in Scripture; all that matters is whether her husband, master, or father
approved it. You must not resort to the Bible to acknowledge that this is morally flawed, but you
can find in it the foundation for holding this immoral stance. Even the Roman Church itself has
been complicit with clergymen’s widespread child rape, keeping offenders in the parishes where
they are insulated from allegations (Hitchens 4, 228), so how can we expect mere laypersons to
disambiguate what is moral or immoral in this context of sexual abuse that is so fundamentally
part of the story of their salvation?
Lastly in this chapter, it is also important to touch on another prejudicial view: the
prohibition against same-sex intercourse or relationships. A man that lies with a male as he does
with a woman is seen as “an abomination”, for those are “dishonorable passions (…) contrary to
nature” (Lev. 18.22, Rom. 1.26). When men “gave up natural relations with women and were
consumed with passion for one another”, these “shameless acts” of pursuing “unnatural desire”
had very clear consequences (Rom. 1.26, Jude 7). This kind of “sexual immorality” sin is subject
to three penalties: first, those engaging in it “shall be cut off from among their people”; second,
“they shall surely be put to death”; lastly, they will undergo “a punishment of eternal fire” (Lev.
18.29, 20.13, Jude 7). Earthly and eternal castigation await those who commit the sin of
homosexuality. Scripture’s attitude on the impermissibility of these acts could not have been
clearer, and once again, any layperson can clearly and distinctively derive that God, according to
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Scripture, is definite about these matters, not according to one’s own subjective interpretation of
certain passages, but with a textualist approach.
Connections between Scripture and the poor treatment that the LGBTQ+ community is
subjected to can also be drawn. Many Western religious societies (even if de jure secular)
display high numbers of rate crime against gay men (2017 “Hate Crime Statistics”). LGBTQ+
youth in the United States is also 120% more likely to experience homelessness (Seip). In the
entire world, approximately 20 to 30% of those living in homeless or analogous conditions are
LGBTQ+ members (Carta Capital). To say that Scripture has a role in this negative, animal-like
treatment of this group of people is the least. Here, I argue that Scripture has played a distinct
role in propagating discriminatory notions that preach for the exclusion and death of certain
people on the basis of their sexuality.
Surely one may object that contemporary conceptions of right and wrong sharply differ
from those in the Ancient Near East. How dare I use our still in-progress conceptions of morality
to judge actions of the long past? It is true that society has, widely speaking, a vastly different
conception both on women and on homosexuality nowadays. It is not true, however, that those
very ideas I cited from Scripture are dead in society. It is no shock that modern theocracies rank
high in maintaining women under male domination (Shermer 222). Even the most conservative
statistics place over 35% of the women in the world as victims of sexual harassment and violence
(“Rape Statistics by Country 2021”). When it comes to LGBTQ+ members, many religious
groups do not hesitate in expressing their volition to kill homosexuals, and Christian preachers
still torment individuals to this day calling their sexuality, if not heterosexual, an abomination
(Shermer 242, 252). A historical analysis points to how religious attitudes are among the greatest
hindrances to the LGBTQ+ rights battle (Shermer 244). Framing not only acts but also
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homosexual inclinations as sinful crimes renders the Bible into a static document in what
pertains the conceptual moral change over these very notions (Copan 88). Even looseinterpreters or those in the cherry-picking middle have relied on Scripture to defend their antiLGBTQ+ views. Copan and Flannagan cite Leviticus 18:22 and Romans 1 as evidence for that
all people are bound to the laws against homosexual practices, or against any sexual immorality
as described in the Noahide laws, for that matter (56).
While many societies have adopted an equal and respectful treatment of women and
LGBTQ+ members, it wasn’t due to Scriptural teachings or religion. While there have been
religious denominations that are far more progressive than others, Scripture couldn’t be clearer in
its precepts and condemnations concerning women as inferior beings, and homosexuals as
unnatural anomalies. In the end, it was people that have fought for gay and women’s rights, and
some religious sects have followed along this trend, while many have not, only after a) progress
was ongoing and b) after they have promoted heinous attitudes (Shermer 246, 253). Therefore, if
we accept that 1) the Bible has highly immoral prescriptions when it comes to the treatment of
certain persons qua persons of that kind, and 2) that Christian followers and/or biblical theists
have and still adhere to those stances based on them being precepts from their religion, then 3)
we can see that Scripture also fails as a proper moral guide in this matter.
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3. CATEGORICAL HARM
Another matter subject to contention among scholars is that of Scriptural permissibility in
what concerns categorical harm. In other words, does the Bible allow for actions such as
genocide, death penalties, religious intolerance, child abuse, dispossessing people, and the lesser
treatment of foreigners? In this section, I argue that Scripture allows for the possibility of
individuals engaging in and supporting certain acts of categorical harm, theologically defensible,
that is, while having Scripture as a sound justification for it. I find it useful to begin this quest by
moving in accordance with degree of harm, finalizing this section on the question of genocide,
which is undoubtedly the most controversial matter among the ones we are dealing with. With
this discussion on situations that seem “to give Bible believers precedent for engaging in similar
acts of aggression” (Copan and Flannagan 12), I hope to conclude our analysis on different moral
issues as they pertain to Scripture and their connection to human action.
I characterize religious intolerance for the purposes of this project as not only the
intolerance against a disparate religious belief, but also against religious disbelief, that is,
believers’ intolerance against atheists. We already exposed in the beginning of this project that
Psalm 53:1, that provides that atheists are corrupt because of their disbelief in God, could be
easily utilized as a theological justification for the mistreatment and acknowledgement of atheists
as immoral. Besides speculations, however, we can see the empirical form that this Scriptural
prescription has taken. The biggest Bible apologetics in history such as Augustine, Luther,
Calvin, or Aquinas, endorsed burning heretics alive based on Biblical interpretations, where
Calvin himself burned a Unitarian heretic. (Bergmann, et al. 312). Both Saints, Aquinas and
Augustine, thought heretics should be killed or torture (Harris 11). It is not a matter of chance
that Aquinas saw God as the primary and principal author of Scripture and that he thus, followed
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principles in accordance with Scripture (Copan and Flannagan 21). We will later in this section
see how the conception of a group as wicked people with the potential of corrupting others, can
form a theologically defensible grounds for their very end. No wonder that we can’t even know
much about atheists throughout history, as this disbelief has “in all times and all places been
subject to ruthless suppression” (Hitchens 254). In need of timelier illustrations, we can see how
the Colorado U.S Air Force Academy’s agnostics and Jews were bullied by Born Again
Christians that aimed at forcing belief in Jesus as a requirement for service. Complaints against
the continuous proselytizing were met with suppression, while the bullies went unpunished
(Hitchens 33). Countrywide, however, have the oppositional stances against atheists been.
Charles Stanley, Senior Pastor of the First Baptist Church in Atlanta, endorsed war against those
that oppose God, because God says so (Hitchens 35).
Blasphemy, or one’s dissenting opinion about the seemingly ‘God norm’, is also validly
inferred from Scripture to be proper grounds for doing away with individuals. Leviticus 24:16
couldn’t be more explicit in that “Whoever blasphemes the name of the LORD shall surely be
put to death [emphasis added]. All the congregation shall stone him. The sojourner as well as the
native, when he blasphemes the Name, shall be put to death”. Salman Rushdie had a fatwa issued
upon him and had to seek exile from India because of his controversial book, The Satanic Verses,
where Rushdie paralleled the Quran with ‘Satanic Verses’. For his was considered an act of
blasphemy, he was wanted dead by the Muslim Ayatollah. The Vatican, the Archbishop of
Canterbury, the chief Sephardic Rabbi of Israel, the Cardinal Archbishop of New York, and
others, took the Ayatollah’s side in that an immoral act was taken against the Muslim faith -blasphemy. While the death threats may have been denounced, the support for blasphemy as a
sin was upheld, opening the door for one’s acceptance of the Biblical prescriptions against it
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(Hitchens 30). Likewise, the Pope and Archbishop of Canterbury condemned the Danish
cartoons that provided a caricature of Muhammad, validating the ‘immorality’ of blasphemy
(Hitchens 281). Blasphemy provisions were also prevalent in the U.S – Maryland considered it a
crime punishable by torture, branding, and death (Hitchens 34). Could these stances have been
more coherent with the Scriptural text’s assertions? I don’t see how to argue otherwise.
In what concerns the religious intolerance against other religions, the Scriptural text is
quite clear. Deuteronomy 13:6-9, shows to do what is right under the eyes of God is to kill those
(even family members) that want to worship other gods or might try and get you to believe in
other gods. Adding to this commandment, Exodus 23:24 clarifies that not only one shall not
serve other gods, but one shall “utterly overthrow them and break their pillars in pieces”. The
abomination of idol worship or following other religions should also be met with death, whether
you’re an old man, a young man, a young woman, a married woman, or a child (Ezek. 9.6).
Moses himself, when he realizes his people started worshipping a golden calf, commands that the
most amount of idolaters be killed, a commandment “ordained for the service of the LORD, each
one at the cost of his son and of his brother, so that he might bestow a blessing upon you this day
[emphasis added]” (Exod. 3.29) – killing idolaters was worthy of God’s blessedness. In Numbers
25, Moses also condemns the Midianite worshippers of Baal of Peor to impalement. Lastly, the
book of Zechariah maintains the provisions against idolaters, specifically, “(…) And his father
and mother who bore him shall pierce him through when he prophesies” (Zech. 13.3).
Both Exodus 34 and Deuteronomy 7:3 give precise prescriptions that one should destroy
the altars and images of other gods’ worshippers, with apparent soundness with events as the
Taliban attack against the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan’s righteousness. The Islamic law
against idol worship may not have been directly based on the same Scripture that concerns this
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project. Nonetheless, if it had been issued by a Christian government, it would still, according to
the Scriptural text, present a pious action for the salvation of humanity. What is difficult to
defend, however, is that any society should accept that as sufficient justification for the
destruction of a certain culture. We certainly do not want to allow for the loophole in which
divinely authorized murder is acceptable murder.
The rules on death punishments, as delineated by Scripture, include more than just
provisions against atheists and idolaters. As we discussed previously, sexual immorality was
punishable by death. Furthermore, so was cursing one’s parents, as Jesus himself laid out the
appropriateness of the Mosaic death penalty laws (Copan and Flannagan 42). In Deuteronomy
21:18-21, we find the provisions for when one’s son is stubborn and rebellious: “all men of the
city shall stone him to death with stones”. But how can one discipline one’s child? Proverbs
13:24 has the answer: “Whoever spared the rod hates his son, but he who loves him is diligent to
discipline him.”, as we see previously that “a rod is for the back of him who lacks sense” (Prov.
10.13). If the issue remains obscure, Scripture enlightens us, “Do not withhold discipline from a
child; if you strike him with a rod, he will not die. If you strike him with the rod, you will save
his soul from Sheol” (Prov. 23.13-14).
Surely one may object to the fact that this child abuse is not propagated in society and
was fruit of the rudimentary times where Scripture was canonized. Unfortunately, we have
empirical evidence that this text has led to real action from believers and informs societal views
on disciplining children. The Bethel Baptist Church in El Sobrante, CA is a great example. It is
not just that the denomination tells members to “Spank your children or oppose God’s will”, but
that the church “recommends using a ‘rod’ or flexible stick to swat children until their will is
broken” because “all other methods are not designed by God [emphasis added]” (Bergmann, et
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al. 44). Child abuse has been foundational to biblical teachings, and they are still propagated to
this day on the name of God. Child abuse in the name of God is not only a reality in North
America. Brazil had to enact a law against the corporal punishment of children by their parents
because of the high religiosity rate in the country in which the main justification for physical
punishment was to please God (Alkimin). It is of little surprise that the fiercest opposition to this
law came from the Evangelical Caucus in the Brazilian Congress, who saw this law as a
hindrance to their religious freedom of disciplining their children as God wishes them to, based
specifically, on the aforementioned biblical verses (Feitosa and Macêdo).
Whether one might see Abraham’s sacrifice attempt or Jephthah’s sacrifice of his own
daughter as representative of that notion, we don’t need to go this far into the dialectic of God’s
biblical commands. We already have in hand evidence that Scriptural explicit provisions on
educating one’s children not only demands child abuse but is in fact propagated as a proper guide
of conduct because the literal text of the Bible says so. One can arrive at the understanding that
educating children by spanking and abusing them is immoral despite of Scripture, but within it,
one can find a theologically defensible justification for doing so (Bergmann, et al. 44). That is, of
course, only if we consider that spanking one’s child with a rod until their will is broken to be
indicative of child abuse, which is a position I maintain.
Some of the systemic violence against women also had its biblical roots. In Leviticus
20:27 we find that due to their unholiness, “A woman (…) who is (…) a necromancer shall
surely be put to death. They shall be stoned with stones; their blood shall be upon them” and
Exodus 22:18 underscores the idea that one must never allow a witch to live. From these notions
it followed that the Roman Catholic Church propagated the idea that witches are the causal
explanation for evil, to the point of issuing guides as to how to prosecute them (Shermer 109-
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110). Before we discard this by the virtue of its outdatedness, we must shift our Westernized
standpoint. In countries like Papua New Guinea, India, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Ghana,
Gambia, Tanzania, Kenya, and Sierra Leone, so-called witches still face the threat of
immolation. Truth be told, witch believers outnumber non-believers in sub-Saharan Africa
(Shermer 110). A 2002 World Health Organization report illuminates the severity of the issue:
thousands of women and children have been killed and torched in Nigeria and Tanzania by not
only just any believer, but by bishops as well (Shermer 110). More recently, in 2013, a Papuan
woman was tortured “with a hot iron rod, (…) and doused in gasoline and ignited” (Shermer
110-111). Paul Copan himself admits that horrendous acts, including the witch hunts, have been
done in the name of God or Christ, and once more, I find it extremely difficult to argue that
Scripture cannot be used as a theological defense for such categorical harm (Copan 369).
Without much digression, I think it is also useful to see the kind of loophole that
Scripture is subject to that allows for the justification on one’s discriminatory contemporary
political stance, that is, the lesser treatment of immigrants. Paul Copan justifies the
discrimination against immigrants in the U.S. and the neglect of their basic needs with Scripture.
In Romans 13 we find the provisions regarding the submission to authorities. In it, tax payment
is underscored as an act of submission to the authorities, and thus, to God. Copan distorts this
text to affirm that according to Romans 13, “for the sake of maintaining order and preserving the
privilege and dignity of citizenship in a country, priority should be given to tax-paying citizens
over illegals when it comes to health care, drivers’ licenses, insurance, and the like” (240). His
analysis continues, “The same held true in Ancient Israel. The foreigner (nokri) was more like an
illegal immigrant. The resident alien/sojourner (ger), however, sought to play by Israel’s rules.
Unlike the resident alien, foreigners weren’t willing to abide by Israel’s covenant relationship
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with God, so they shouldn’t expect to receive all the privileges of an Israelite citizen” (Copan
240). It is clear, thus, that the anarchy in Scriptural exegeses can and has allowed for the
grounding of immoral views on the Bible.
Before getting to genocide per se, we shall analyze how the Scriptural text, in what
pertains the dispossessing of people, has related to worldly colonization efforts and how it can
inspire further dispossession in contemporary times. The Israelites had followed Moses’ lead so
that they could get to the Promised Land. However, the Land that is taken to be rightfully Jewish,
was inhabited by other communities. Thus, we understand why in Numbers 21:32 Moses
dispossesses the Amorites, and why Numbers 33:50 provides for the driving out and complete
dispossession of the Canaanites. The book of Joshua shows the quest towards continuing the late
Moses’ legacy and taking charge in bringing God’s people to the Promised Land. Reading this
with history on our side, many people will derive from the book that God has promises for a new
day coming in the future. However, many have not seen it under such light. As Nicholas
Wolterstorff grants, the danger of the book of Joshua can be seen in that “Colonists are strongly
tempted to read it as authorizing violent conquest in the name of God. That’s how some of the
American colonists read it, that’s how some of the Afrikaner colonists read it, that’s how some
Israelis today read it, as they attempt to dispossess the Palestinians.” (Bergmann, et al. 256).
It is precisely in modern day Zionism that we can see how Scripture allows for heinous
acts to be done in its name. The Prophet Amos promised that the people of Israel would be
brought from exile and “they shall rebuild the ruined cities and inhabit them”, and that God “will
plant on their land, and they shall never again be uprooted out of the land that I have given them”
(Amos 9.14-15). Israeli efforts in dispossessing Palestinians base their sovereignty claim over
Judea and Samaria (now the disputed areas of the Palestinian West Bank) in passages such as
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Deuteronomy 1:6-8, Genesis 15:18-21, and Exodus 23:31 in which God delineates the areas
promised to his chosen people (Goodman and Levy 55). Therefore, Israel currently exercises
colonial rule over Palestinians through disenfranchisement, occupation, land confiscation, and
expulsion, in order to fulfill the divine prophecy and promise (Goodman and Levy 55). It is not
only that the possibility exists that modern Israelites will make territorial claims over another
nation and act on these claims, but rather, that is what currently takes place. Scripture is the
foundation for Zionist sovereignty claims over Palestine, and thousands of Palestinians are being
dispossessed by the day. The only standpoint in which this can be considered moral is the
standpoint of the individual that believes to be entitled to this piece of land because they are part
of God’s chosen people. Otherwise, this dispossession on religious grounds is nothing but
another humanitarian crisis.
We may now enter the discussion on I genocide warrants. As complex as this theme is, I
must lay out my goal. I will present the Scriptural instances where, if literally read, God
commands genocide. Then, I will present the argument that supports that God commanded
genocide in specific instances, namely, the ‘issuing of difficult commandments’ claim. What will
follow will be the contraposing argument that not all of God’s seemingly genocidal commands
were in fact such. I will respond to these claims posing the empirical evidence we have in hand
in what concerns these matters, concluding that both arguments – the difficult commandments
argument and the historical analysis – fail at circumventing the loophole issue, that is, despite of
them, believers can and do still derive a theological defense for genocide.
There are around at least eleven occurrences of the biblical God commanding his chosen
people to utterly destroy others (Copan and Flannagan 80). Highlighting a few, we have
Numbers 31:2, where the Lord incites Moses to attack the Midianites, which in turn, would allow
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them to be gathered to their people. Deuteronomy 20 gives guidelines on committing genocide
against foreign people in a land that the chosen people would want to conquer, verse 16
illuminates that everyone in the nearby towns of the conquest should be killed. In 1 Samuel,
Samuel asks Saul to “strike down Amalek, and put under the ban everything he has, you shall not
spare him, and you shall put to death man and woman, infant and sucking, ox and sheep, camel
and donkey”, and this very story still plays a political role for the Prime Minister of Israel in his
dealings against Iran. Continuously, however, we find the issuing of commandments that relate
to the destruction of other communities. In Jeremiah 50:21, God commands that his people “(…)
kill, and devote them [Babylonians] to destruction” for their idol worship. The prescription
against Babylonians continues in Psalm 137:7-8, “(…) blessed are those who take your little
ones and dash them against the rock”. In the book of Joshua, 6:21 explains what took place in
Jericho: “they devoted all in the city to destruction, both men and women, young and old, oxen,
sheep, and donkey, with the edge of the sword”. Because of the explicit language, Richard
Dawkins equated the accounts of the destruction of Jericho and the invasion of the Promised
Land with Hitler’s invasion of Poland (280). In the following verses we find that “just as Moses
the servant of the Lord had commanded”, “Joshua captured all the cities of these kings, and all
their kings, and he struck them with the edge of the sword, and utterly destroyed them” (Josh.
11.12). Further, in the surrounding cities, “(…) they left no one who breathed”, because God has
issued this commandment to Moses, who passed it along to Joshua, who “left nothing undone of
all that the Lord had commanded Moses” (Josh. 11.15).
What we can see is that the biblical text in itself is not esoteric in what pertains to the
matter in hand. However, one of the views I aim at exposing solves the seeming contradiction
between an all-loving good deity and a God that demands the utter destruction of whole
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civilizations. What I call the ‘difficult commandments argument’ asserts that God, at times, has
to issue difficult commandments to accomplish his purposes, and in certain highly unusual
situations, God’s ends would justify these commandments. William Lane Craig argues that the
crucial moral principle against slaughtering various peoples, in its stricto sensu, doesn’t hold for
all always – a just God would have sufficient reason to deviate from this moral principle in
specific instances (qtd. In Copan and Flannagan 145). One may wonder what could possibly
characterize a circumstance in which a community’s annihilation becomes permissible? First,
God wouldn’t issue the slaughter of innocents, only of morally wicked and corrupt cultures
(Bergmann, et al. 99). Second, the wickedness of such a culture must be so abominable that it
poses the danger of corrupting the righteous (Bergmann, et al. 142). So, following this argument,
there are instances, as reflected in Scripture, in which God commanded the slaughter of certain
wicked people, such as the Canaanites, the Babylonians, the Amorites, and Jerichoans, to
accomplish his just and loving ends.
But what led these people to be so wicked? Paul Copan and Matthew Flannagan
enlighten us on the topic: “The kinds of wicked acts (Deut. 9:4-5) the Canaanites engaged in
were not trivial: incest, adultery, bestiality, ritual possession, homosexual acts, [emphasis added]
and most significantly, child sacrifice (Lev. 18; Deut. 12:29-31)” (75). They go on to explain that
even modern Western societies render these acts impermissible, or illegal, and that to this day we
consider these actions abominable, justifying some nation’s capital punishment against them. We
also seem to have evidence that these abominable acts would in fact corrupt the Israelites, as the
Midianites had led the Israelites into adultery and idolatry at Baal-Peor, inducing, precisely, the
“divinely mandated battle against them” (Copan and Flannagan 273). However, haven’t we
already seen that the Israelites themselves were morally flawed? First, God constantly threatens
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to destroy the Israelites due to their bad actions (Bergmann, et al. 262). Second, if we recall the
moral development objection we engaged with in the elementary sections of this project, wasn’t
the reason why God didn’t issue specific and progressive commands to the Israelites because
they were so corrupt that he had to “tone down” his moral demands? (Bergmann, et al. 93) It
doesn’t seem to follow that the utter destruction of others merely on the grounds of wickedness is
sufficient explanation for the phenomenon. Further, if we analyze the so-called wicked actions, it
is hard to justify that they are to be met with utter destruction. Incest itself is legal in certain U.S.
states and several Western and Eastern countries. Adultery laws have long become unenforced
and is hardly seen as a basis for capital punishment (besides in certain theocracies). Despite the
eleven Islamic jurisdictions that punish homosexuality with death, the amount of nations that
support “homosexual acts” outnumbers the dissenters. It is not so clear that, as Copan and
Flannagan maintain, contemporary modern society also perceives these acts as abominable and
worthy of capital punishment. Of course, the morality held in the Ancient Near East was
completely oppositional to this, but whether people agree or disagree on these issues, the
objective moral character of certain actions remains unchanged. What we are faced with is, thus,
that certain actions, which are not necessarily and absolutely immoral were the justification for a
group of people to be utterly destroyed.
If we are to uphold that God sometimes issues difficult commands for the sake of just and
loving ends, Louise Antony’s conclusion follows, that is, that the only crime the Canaanites
committed were living in the land God wanted to give his people. That is the case because the
evidence in hand already points to the notion that the Israelites were considered wicked, and so
were the Canaanites, so the issuing of the command for the latter’s utter destruction on the
grounds of wickedness becomes superfluous. Further, this justification fails at evading the fact
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that modern readers can derive that divinely mandated wars against wicked people (whatever
one’s subjective notion of wicked may be) for their salvation is morally permissible. As Wes
Morriston argues, one could easily find an analogy between Biblical narratives and the
possibility of a highly militarized country like the United States, “to obliterate (…) the nation of
Iran”, of which many find to be a wicked nation (qtd. in Copan and Flannagan 50). Surely, the
response follows that the commandment against the Canaanites was issued under the specific
context of the Abrahamic covenant, and thus, was an occasional command not intended to bind
us moderns (Copan and Flannagan 57-58). At one point in history God may have commanded
Joshua to utterly destroy the Canaanites, and “no other country in history was set apart for this
purpose of party to this covenant” (Copan and Flannagan 57). The action doesn’t become
permissible merely because God commanded it in one specific historical context for a specific
theological end, and one must not generalize its permissibility (Copan 293). While this aims at
solving the issue of, for example, the possibility of the United States claiming a divinely
mandated war against another nation, how is one to determine what is and what isn’t a legitimate
divine command? How are we to tell the sincere believer that his claim that God issued him a
commandment for the killing of wicked people and that otherwise he will burn in hell is false?
While we may want to render it false, I find it disingenuous to do so if we are to maintain that at
one point God did issue this commandment. If he has done it once, who are we to infer into the
mind of the divinity and interpret it as otherwise? We will return to this question shortly.
The counterargument asserts that an important part of this dialectic is that not all of the
biblical genocidal commandments are in fact such. If the Joshua chapters were to be read literally
and in isolation, it would be fair to conclude that Israel committed genocide against the
Canaanites (Copan and Flannagan 82). If we compare, however, the biblical literature with other
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Ancient Near East literatures, and we analyze the broader canonical context “it is evident [!]”
that not all occurrences of the ‘utterly destroy’ language are to be understood literally, but rather,
that “the biblical narrative utilizes hyperbolic (…) syntagms to build up the account” (Copan and
Flannagan 99). The hyperbolic tone indicated by an extensive cross-analysis, thus, shows that it
wasn’t often that God wanted to annihilate other peoples, sometimes they were just to be
dispossessed (Copan and Flannagan 76). As Copan affirms, dispossessing people is completely
different from wiping them out or destroying them. A historical and canonical analysis will tell
us that it would be highly contradictory if it was the fact that in the book of Joshua genocide had
truly taken place – the following books show how not everyone was killed. A grammatical
analysis of Deuteronomy 20:10-18 shows us how the language only permits the killing of men in
a certain situation, and not all people were killed anyway, as the Biblical war accounts are to be
read as highly hyperbolical (Copan and Flannagan 58). This hyperbolical character also explains
that the utter destruction of the Canaanites didn’t refer to their culture, but merely to their wicked
religious practices (Copan and Flannagan 107) – one can derive these notions by engaging in a
scholarly analysis of the canonization process, the history of the Ancient Near East, and the war
literature of the time.
Unfortunately, the layperson, or in this case, the lay believer does not engage in this type
of complex quest in search for the truth about specific syntagms and their meaning in Ancient
literature. If one must engage in a highly complex scholarly endeavor to derive this idea, it is
clear that such notion will not be available to all. So while we may argue that this or that
morpheme means X, Y, or Z based on a holistic investigation of grammar, history, and theology,
this won’t yield a practical effect: the bulk of believers are not, in fact, scholars and academics.
Hence, relying on a highly intricate Scriptural interpretation with the hopes of illuminating the
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fact that God probably did or did not issue a commandment to the extent that it is said to literally
have been, is nothing other than an illusion. We can go back and forth ad infinitum pointing at
specific passages as an attempt of showing which one does and which one doesn’t represent God
accurately, but this subjectivity is not only a cherry-picker tool, but also fails as a realistic option
when we consider the demographics of believers across the globe.
Eric Seibert asserts that the distinction we must pay heed to is that, considering the
hyperbolic tone, the ‘textual’ God may have commanded genocide, but it doesn’t mean that the
‘actual’ God did (qtd. in Copan and Flannagan 50). I concur with Richard Dawkins in that
theologians may protest against divinely commanded genocide actually having taken place,
based on the cross-literary and holistic Biblical analysis, but “The point is that, whether true or
not, the Bible is held up to us as the source of our morality”, and what it does say loud and clear,
is that the utter destruction of certain groups was mandated by God so that his chosen people
could relish their Promised Land (280).
Yet, the crux of the matter isn’t whether the facticity of these events holds, or which
intentions God has. The latter, for example, is subject to the very contentions that are the object
of this project. On the one hand some scholars’ canonical analyses derive God’s reasons for
issuing certain commands, on the other hand, others contend that “Scripture leaves us largely in
the dark as to why God issues the commands in the first place” (Copan and Flannagan 233). In
spite of this, what concerns this project is whether these passages can be twisted for evil
purposes in modernity, that is, whether one can use or has used these literally-read passages
concerning genocide as a drive to action.
In the colonization of North America, Catholic nobleman Sir George Peckham resorted to
the Old Testament to justify the British conquest: comparing God’s commands to the Israelites in
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Canaan to British prerogatives over North America, Peckham concluded that the British were
God’s new chosen people, “thus possessed a divine mandate to ‘plant, possess, and subdue’
those regions of the world still inhabited by heathens and savages”, and he added that “(…) the
extermination of Canaanite resisters (…) afforded ample precedent for the English successors to
God’s favor in their dealings with the ‘heathen’ and ‘idolaters’ who dealt in the New World
Canaan.” (Cave 282). In Colonial America, the Puritan Reverend Richard Mather rendered the
Pequot Indians of Connecticut as “cursed seeds of Canaan”, which justified the advancement of a
“holy war” against the Natives (294). Paul Copan and Matthew Flannagan themselves claim that
“legitimate governments have a God-given obligation to protect their citizens from the threats
within and without – to ‘bear the sword’ (Romans 13:1-7)” (297). The former also asserts that
currently, “our warfare against Satan and his hosts has its roots in Yahweh wars in the Old
Testament” (Copan 252).
It is quite evident that not only has Scriptural war text inspired and justified dispossession
efforts via colonization and maintaining the right that a divinely commanded war is a just war.
One may object that just because, for example, Islamic terrorists believe that God mandated
suicide bombing, it doesn’t follow that divine command theory should support terrorism. While I
agree, this diverts from the scope of this project. It may very well be the case that merely because
people are carrying out immoral actions inspired by the Scriptural text that doesn’t mean that
they are correctly doing so. The point is, however, that this does commit biblical Scripture to the
loophole issue I presented. The Bible can in fact be used to justify wiping people out – Christian
Churches were highly implicated in the Rwandan genocide, and many Zionist figures assert their
position based on the Biblical text that affirms the Jewish’s destiny is to return to the Promised
Land (Goodman and Levy 53), and that is just scratching the surface.
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William Lane Craig words couldn’t ring truer when he argues that the only way that the
biblical theist would endorse Hitler or the Rwandan genocide “if the biblical theist believes that
Hitler, (…) or the Hutus were commanded by God to do what they did” (Copan and Flannagan
145). It may be discomfiting to admit that anyone would endorse these pro-ethnic cleansing
views, but history shows us that people do at times support them. This is precisely where the
loophole issue intrigues us: not only people have wicked ideas, but they find in Scripture a
coherent basis for them. Once more, I must emphasize that the object of my claim isn’t whether
action X or Y did in fact take place, rather, what concerns us is that actions X and Y are said to
have happened not by any mundane or banal literature, but by the book that is self-described to
contain the words of the Savior. This fact alone is the root of the problem we have in hand.
To finalize, we shall return to the question we left on hold. How are we to distinguish a
legitimate prophetic claim from an illegitimate one? How are we to tell that God did expect the
Israelites to dispossess the Canaanites, but he doesn’t expect, let’s say, the current Israeli
government to dispossess the Palestinians from the Promised Land? Copan and Flannagan argue
that we can easily deny a current prophetic claim of divinely mandated war because of the “lack
of prophetic and character qualifications, absence of supporting divine signs and wonders, and
the like” (318). This fails, however, as a useful criterion for this distinction. Deuteronomy 7
states, “When the Lord your God brings you into the land that you are entering to take possession
of it, and clears away many nations before you, (…) and when the Lord your God gives them
over to you, and you defeat them, then you must devote them to complete destruction. You shall
make no covenant with them and show no mercy to them. You shall not intermarry with them,
(…). But thus shall you deal with them: you shall break down their altars and dash in pieces
their pillars and chop down their Asherim and burn their carved images with fire. (…) Know
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therefore that the Lord your God is God, the faithful God who keeps covenant and steadfast love
with those who love him and keep his commandments, to a thousand generations [emphasis
added] (…)”. This can very easily be understood by any modern-day Jewish Israelite that the
arrangements of God’s covenants are still in place, being very strong evidence even by Copan
and Flannagan’s standards. Can we blame Zionists for believing the word of the Savior?
Regardless of how implausible or wrong individuals may find this, the sincere believer cannot be
at fault for taking God’s words as absolute when it comes to core of the Old Testament – God
delivering his Promised Land. The hermeneutical maneuvers here presented also show the power
of the loophole issue – it allows for the fact that at least once, God commanded the slaughter of
certain people, and how could mere mortals like us tell whether God has or has not found another
special circumstance in which he has to issue difficult commands for the sake of his loving ends?
The unfalsifiable prophetic claim of modern Jews is, at minimum, at par with the biblical claims.
While rich, the discussion on a) whether God did command genocide, b) whether
genocide did take place, or c) what reasons God did or did not have in commanding certain
undertakings, is purposeless. What concerns us is what is written in the Holy Bible, and what is
written, textually speaking, is that God issues the command to utterly destroy the Canaanites, the
Amorites, the Moabites, the Jerichoans, and so on and so forth until the Promised Land could
have been inhabited by the chosen people. I have no qualms with the objection that the
exegetical method I propose may fall under the fallacy of misplaced realism – misunderstanding
a hyperbolical statement for a literal one (Copan and Flannagan 171). If we are to accept that
this is indeed a fallacious argument (which I don’t think we can), this only shows us how easy
and plausible it is for others to fall under the same fallacy. As previously stated, the majority of
religion adherents that come into contact and engage with these texts are poor and uneducated.
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The working class is not a body of scholars meticulously cross-analyzing Ancient Near East
texts, finding the roots of Hebrew words, or critically inspecting Scriptural syntagms. The mass
of people that come into contact to this text and resort to it in times of trouble are highly
susceptible to falling into, if it really is such, the fallacy of misplaced realism. Failing to evade
the loophole issue, people still have theological grounds for supporting genocide, the
dispossession of others, or the overall categorical harm posited in Scripture.
In conclusion, first, the ‘difficult commandments argument’ fails to provide a proper and
clear criterion on how to differentiate a legitimate divine mandate from an illegitimate one. If we
accept that God issued once the command to slaughter others, then the possibility that he may do
it again is still alive, and we, as mere humans who lack Divine Providence are incapable of
inferring into the mind of the divinity and tell whether he has or will issue those difficult
commandments again as we cannot possibly know God’s purposes to their full extent. Likewise,
the historical and canonical analysis that provides a holistic exegetical method in which the
totality of Scripture, Ancient Near East warfare accounts, and hyperbolic rhetoric is taken into
account in order to derive truth from the Bible, also fails in being a practical and efficient method
for avoiding the loophole issue. The working-class layperson cannot afford the time to question
the words of salvation. Further, they don’t have the resources to even engage in such a quest or
the means to analyze what Hebrew grammatical particles mean in order to decipher the meaning
of the text. While it might be “evident” for certain scholars how certain passages are to be read,
many laypeople simply “listen to the words of the cloud of witnesses who speak to them across
millennia from its [Bible] pages” (Bergmann, et al. 134). When an entire scholarly historical
analysis is required to point out that it may not be the case that God expects us, now, to violate
the moral principle against destroying communities, then all that matters is history. History
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shows us that people have used the text to justify atrocious acts that are coherent with the literal
Scriptural text. History also shows us that people are, currently, still using the text to justify
barbarity. Whichever reading is preferred, the conclusion is clear that what appears to us is that
God “doesn’t so much care whether murder occurs as he cares whether the murder is
authorized” (Bergmann, et al. 40), and precisely this high bar is impossible to be met with
absolute certainty due to the unfalsifiable character of religious claims that emulate the Scriptural
text, and thus, the possibility remains of the theological defense for a stance that supports any of
the categorical harms exposed in this section. Hence, the Bible, as a moral guide on this matter,
appears to us as flawed.
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CONCLUSION
We shall return to our goals ab ovo. I aimed at exposing three instances that show us the
lethal danger of biblical Scripture. To that end, I brought to light the fact that there is an
interpretative spectrum in which individuals may fall under literal or fundamentalist interpreters,
cherry-picking interpreters, or loose- or non-interpreters. What follows from this spectrum is that
many biblical interpretations are plausible, but all are subject to the loophole issue. As outlined
in this paper, the loophole issue is nothing other than the fact that due to there not existing an
absolute biblical interpretation, but an interpretation spectrum of which the lowest bar for
soundness with it it’s a literal cohesion, this spectrum allows for loopholes in which individuals
can and have ascribed to immoral precepts and undertook immoral and abominable acts in the
name of God in a theologically defensible manner. We shall summarize our findings hitherto.
We have attempted to provide three accounts of instances in which the possibility of an
individual undertaking an immoral action due to their reading of Scripture exists. That is such
because, as I argue in this paper, Scripture contains passages in which, if read literally, either
permit, endorse, or command people to engage in immoral actions. That is, they can be
theological precedents for supporting undertakings like slavery, racism, religious intolerance,
subordination of women, homophobia, colonization, dispossession, or even genocide. This paper,
logically, characterizes those actions as immoral ones.
We argued that Biblical-based morality fails in two counts: epistemically and
motivationally. We expect to have shown that 1) biblical theists – those that accept both that God
exists, and that the Bible has his authoritative word – as such don’t necessarily have any
advantage in identifying true morality or properly disambiguating between right and wrong in
comparison to the non-biblical theist, an atheist, or an individual that follows secular values
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(Copan and Flannagan 141). If it were the case, the empirical data we would find wouldn’t be so
opaque. Instead of finding that those looking at Scripture to identify good from bad are (at best)
just as susceptible to acting immorally as to those who don’t look at it for these purposes, we
would find that the former would be disproportionately affected by an accurate identification of
true morality, or in other words, would be acting “well” in disproportionate amounts in relation
to individuals in the latter condition. What we have exposed here, however, is that Scripture can
be a stumbling block to those looking for moral answers – it can, quite coherently, drive people
to act immorally.
Our second aim was to have shown that 2) religion’s motivational aspect also fails –
contrariwise, it is precisely one of the driving tools for the misidentification of morality as
above-mentioned. The religious incentives that can motivate action – a policing divinity and the
emotive relationship with the divine – are precisely what gives the theological justification when
one engages in an immoral action based on textual reading. Religion entails this motivational
factor, so how can we tell the sincere believer who is sincerely motivated to act on his beliefs
and feelings towards the divinity and who may be afraid of divine backlash in the scenario where
he doesn’t engage in a certain action, that his belief is immoral and thus he shouldn’t do so?
Religion is what can motivate his immoral action, and everything that it entails allows for the
problem in which it fails in having a distinct role in motivating individuals to do good or to
identify what is good. The quest we promised to engage in, that of showing that Christian
followers and/or biblical theists do not act exclusively in a virtuous fashion and do in fact utilize
Scripture for ignoble ends, has been reached. To show that this has been established, we will
summarize our findings as it pertains to the three categories this project concerned itself with.
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In our account of the relationship between biblical prescriptions on slavery and its
discharge in action, we showed that there has been and that still can be a correlation between
religious belief – or for the sake of this project, belief in Christian Scripture as the word of God –
and one’s warm feelings towards slavery or racism. We pointed out how during the Transatlantic
Slave Trade, Catholic priests and Protestant pastors utilized Scripture and its precepts to justify
and accept the practice. Narrowing down to the American context, we saw how Scripture was
used both as a support for abolitionist as well as for segregationist and pro-slavery stances. We
showed that this was due to the problem of arbitrariness that hail from the scriptural
interpretation spectrum: biblical cherry-pickers use certain passages to justify one’s point of view
when it is convenient to do so. Since we are concerned with coherence, we wanted to make sure
that one could soundly derive the pro-slavery or segregationist stance. What we found is that
there are several passages in which, if, literally read, can provide a plausible foundation for such.
To summarize, Exodus 21:20-21 can be a clear justification for hitting one’s slave with a rod as
long as they don’t die, and Titus 2:9 plays the same role in justifying the maintenance of one’s
status as a slave. To this day, as informal as that may be, Bible apologetics call atheist shows to
justify slavery using Scripture, and Protestants maintain that movements like Black Lives Matter
are anti-Christian because the Gospel is clearly against racial reconciliation. Thus, we contend
that the possibility that concerns us exists: one can derive a pro-slavery or pro-segregationist
stance that is coherent with what the Bible, textually speaking, says, and thus, represents an
instance in which one can have a sound theological defense for supporting slavery and racism.
In our delineation of the causal probability between the Scriptural text and action aimed
at the various levels of subordination of women or the mistreatment of homosexuals, we also
showed that there has been and that still can be a high correlation between one’s religious belief
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in Scripture and one’s prejudicial feelings towards women or members of the LGBTQ+
community. We once more cross-examined what the Scripture, textually speaking, says and
some of the attitudes believers have held regarding the subject. Passages such as Genesis 3:16, or
the laying out of the Ten Commandments show women’s objectified status. Passages such as
Numbers 30:5-13 shows women’s lesser status in comparison to men/her husband or father.
Timothy 3 delineates the kinds of jobs women cannot have, emphasizing how they must be,
hierarchically, below men. Scripture also lays out the precepts against menstruation, or better
saying, for it’s characterization as an uncleanliness or a curse. Another matter of contention for
us was the fact that women’s consent is never mentioned either in sexual relations or for
marriage, whereas her husband’s or father’s is required.
In the subject of homosexuality, passages like Leviticus 18 or Romans 1:26 are explicit
about the inordinate nature of homosexual inclinations and the earthly and divine punishment
that would result from it. Textually speaking, the Bible can be coherently read as a guide on how
to treat both of these groups. Stances against the participation of women in the workforce, or
contrary to the belief that sexual assault is possible, or even of considering women inferior to
men are not at all far from what the biblical text says, in fact, they are strikingly
indistinguishable from it. The same is true for anti-LGBTQ+ stances. Once more, the possibility
that concerns us holds true. In the case of women and homosexuality, one can coherently derive
the attitude that both groups as less-then or even that homosexuality should be met with the death
penalty, in high coherence with the text we have exposed in this project. One can, consistently,
derive a theological defensible stance for the lesser status of women (commodification,
objectification, sexual assault…) and against homosexual practices or inclinations.
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Lastly, we analyzed whether the possibility we were looking for exists for certain
instances of categorical harm. First, can believers coherently derive a religious intolerant or an
anti-atheist stance? Second, can pro-child abuse be coherently derived from the Scriptural text?
Has the witch-hunt brutality had a coherent justification in Scripture? Can one derive the stance
that some people should be dispossessed based on the Bible? Can one justify the extermination
of a group of people based on the same grounds? The textual clarity in these topics aids our
investigation. Across history, apologetics and believers have justified the repression against socalled heretics with biblical mandates from the books of Leviticus to Psalms. Idolaters and
worshippers of other gods are also to be met with suppression and death. The anti-atheist
sentiments that are found to this day can be easily traced to the Bible. The rules on disciplining
children as stated in Proverbs have been directly related to how certain denominations preach the
permissibility of certain actions, and these views have been so widely observed that countries
have had to pass laws banning these religious-based practices. Women seen as witches have been
tortured and burned to death, as is famously known, millennia ago. Surprisingly to some, the
practice still currently takes place in non-Western nations in the name of God.
Modern day Zionism shows how Scripture can be used to achieve theologically
defensible ends via evil means. The passages exposed in this project show 1- that the
dispossession of certain people was documented in the bible as mandated by god, and 2- that this
very precedent is still used to this day. Current Zionists have the biblical text on their side in that
the Promised Land is, according to Scripture, rightfully of Israelites, and that its demarcations
include current Palestinian territory. Considering that, arguably, one of the Old Testament’s main
if not the purpose is to show God’s covenant with Abraham and the articulation of the Promise
that this covenant involved, the use of Scripture for Zionists’ claims of Palestinian territory based
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on divine authority is not, by any means, unwarranted. Lastly, we have argued that when it
comes to the language that, at best, is seemingly endorsing genocide, and at worse, is
commanding genocide, the possibility of it being used for these ends nowadays is not
implausible. We have fully accepted that a) it could be the case that the seemingly genocidal
language is merely hyperbolical, or the claim b) that genocide didn’t in fact take place, or c) that
it wouldn’t make sense for someone else to claim divine warrant for genocide because the text is
very specific to a context that involves God’s covenant with Abraham in which God had
justification to issue these commandments—they were done in congruence with God’s just and
loving ends for humanity.
We see, however, that there’s no point in disputing any of these claims as they are
unfalsifiable. What we concluded was that neither claim a) nor claim b) are useful. Their true or
false character don’t change what the text says, and what we are concerned here is what has been
posited. Claim c) may circumvent the possibility of just any nation claiming divinely mandated
genocide, but it certainly doesn’t get around Zionists’ claims for the dispossession of
Palestinians, au contraire, it reinforces it. And even though claim c) may be sound, it doesn’t
change the fact that people can misuse the text – the way it is written allows for this. The
Rwandan genocide itself had its religious roots, and millions of Tutsis were killed by Hutu
hands, and one of the justifications for this ethnic cleansing came from the Church influences in
the country that saw its justified precedent in Scripture and was one of the most influential
proponents of the Tutsi genocide (Longman 2). Either way, the text is clear, and any layperson
can coherently derive that from the Scriptural text.
This discussion engenders the objection that there is a difference between a
commandment that God actually commanded and a commandment someone says they believe or
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claim that God commanded (Copan and Flannagan 185). This difference is utterly unfalsifiable.
The epistemic position required for one “knowing that God actually commanded something” is
the same in which the person is just believing or claiming that God commanded something
(when he didn’t), they are both still faith-based, one is just affirming that they know an
unfalsifiable position, which they just don’t, and the other thinks that they know, which is also
unfalsifiable, but neither actually know, as it’s impossible and any evaluation of truth-value is
merely inferential. This, nonetheless, still opens room for fanatics to act in the name of God. The
difference between the epistemic position of someone that holds a correct belief and someone
that holds a wrong belief is virtually non-existent. If I wholeheartedly believe that I am correct in
that e.g. the world is flat, I am on the same epistemic ground as someone that believes that e.g.
the world is elliptical. The former believes in his wrong belief the same way the latter believes in
his belief that is, objectively speaking, the correct one. Being wrong and knowing you are wrong
are completely different things, and when people are wrong they mostly think that they are right,
and the belief in something that is, objectively speaking, false, for the believer, is, on the grounds
of conscience, the same belief in something that is, objectively speaking, true. When one
believes they are right about something, regardless of whether they are wrong, they don’t know
that they are wrong, so they “know” something in the same way that the one who thinks they are
right and they are actually right “knows” that thing. Thus, distinguishing between someone’s
claim that God commanded them to do something from God actually have commanded them to
do it is inconceivable. This shows the problem we are open to due to the existence of the
interpretation spectrum and our allowing the Bible to be marketed as a moral guide.
Elucidating this issue further, we didn’t just want to show that the possibility for harm
existed, but that people have engaged, still engage, and still are susceptible to engage in these
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actions. An objection may be raised that in our contemporary times, society won’t accept a
religious stance that comes from a literal reading of the Bible, especially if it is so blatantly
immoral. But even the highest court of the United States has accepted literal exegeses as
legitimate grounds for civil claims. The Amish are famously insulated from mandatory-schooling
state legislation because of a Supreme Court ruling that upheld their literal exegesis of the
Scriptural text. The Amish have a “a fundamental belief that salvation requires life in a church
community separate and apart from the world and worldly influence [“intellectual and scientific
accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other
students)]” (Muñoz 196), which is derived from several biblical passages that emphasize nonconformity and separation from the world. This illustration doesn’t aim at framing this schooling
exemption as immoral, but it aims at portraying one example that sheds light on the danger that
we are vulnerable to – one’s sincerely-held belief in the Scriptural text can, in civil society, be
legitimate grounds for granting exemptions on the basis of religious conscience. The logical
conclusion is that this also has the effect of potentially allowing for one’s immoral stance to be
recognized as acceptable because it is a religious belief that is coherent with Scripture and is
thus, central to one’s religious claims of conscience—the door is certainly open for this
possibility, and if one already renders the Amish claim for children to be separated from, inter
alia, intellectual and scientific accomplishments as an immoral demand, we have already proven
that the potential for harm we are trying to avoid is not only a potential, but an actuality.
Our goal has been to show that religious beliefs have been and can be the cause of hatred
and conflict. Some argue that just because a belief has been causal to atrocities, this character
doesn’t require its jettisoning, and that we must not discard something that can have positive
effects just (!) because it also has negative ones (Copan and Flannagan 209, 267). Reiterating the
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special character of religion, mainly, the categoricity of commands that creates a duty to the
divine despite of earthly (dis)incentives, of which the effect may only be seen in the afterlife and
is insulated from evidence, I have argued contrarily to that notion. I contend that because
religion qua religion has had abusive effects, and it can still have dangerous effects to this day,
we must not look at such a belief as a moral guide. If it not only poses the threat of being used
for evil ends, but it has been and is used for evil ends, then I dispute the claim that we shouldn’t
abandon it. If it can be, has been, and is used for evil ends, then this belief can be harmful, and
thus, we should not propagate it as a moral guide. The very possibility for harm, or what I have
called the loophole issue, is the reason why I argue for the obsolescence of Scriptural morality.
I must underscore that this possibility is already recognized as real – it is not highly
contested that atrocities have been made in the name of God, or that religiously inspired actions
can be abominable (Copan 60, 316). All that we assert is that that that possibility is sufficient for
that we do away with it as a moral guide. If there is something being marketed as a tool for moral
action and that tool can be soundly used for evil, then that tool is a useless moral guide.
I think it is important to emphasize that this project is very concerned with the facts of
reality. We know that the overwhelming majority of religious adherents, and in here I am
focusing on the religion that concerns this project, are the poor and the uneducated. Of course,
not all believers are uneducated or poor, but the bulk of them are. The layperson that comes into
contact with this text has a specific standpoint that is often ignored in the vast literature on
Scripture and the morality it prescribes. It is easy for scholars to claim that the Bible must be
read in X or Y way and that you must only (!) go through a historical, canonical, and crosslinguistic holistic analysis to find out that passage A is to be binding to this day, and passage B is
only metaphorical, and passage C is literal, and passage D is not binding to this day… We could
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go on ad nauseam along this train of thought. This is nothing but another one of the several
subjective interpretations that can be just as easily and coherently with the Scriptural text be
subjectively refuted – whereas I refuse it can be objectively refuted, however. In addition, and
most importantly, this is unrealistic. This strategy doesn’t come close to reaching the average
layperson whose heart is sincerely geared to the Lord’s words for his salvation from this painful
earthly life. If we look at the aggregate, most of the religious of the world are poor. It is not
surprising that in the poorest countries we find the highest rates of religiosity (Gallup, Inc.). You
need only to experience the life in a Third World nation to see the hegemony and pervasiveness
of Christianity among the poorest. Again, it is obviously not only the poor that are religious, but
it is an overwhelming majority of the poor that are religious. Do they have the time or the means
to cross-analyze Ancient Near East war texts? Those who have never even heard the word
‘syntagm’ certainly don’t have the resources for such a thorough and critical analysis. What is
realistic is that many take the words in the book for granted and take it as their guide to salvation
in the afterlife – in the United States alone, almost 30% of Americans believe that the Bible is
the actual word of God to be taken literally (Gallup, Inc.). No amount of cross-text analysis can
change the sincere believer’s opinion on what their duties are to their divinity.
Truth be told, religious people have killed and bombed others or themselves in the name
of God, thinking they will go to heaven. Again, it doesn’t interest us whether they will or not go
to heaven because of their actions, what matters to us is that they think they will. Some
individuals are inspired by religion and risk death, injury, or incarceration for the sake of their
religious conscience (Leiter 36). The fact that they can, at times, coherently do so is precisely
what we have termed the loophole issue derived from the scriptural interpretation spectrum.
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But if not the Bible, then what? Many argue that society needs some type of moral guide
or standard to follow and here I am jettisoning one of the, if not, the main one. Which moral
standard we ought to follow, however, is out of the scope of this project. We certainly point out
that the standard must not be a religious one, which at least narrows down future investigations
on this matter. We contend that focusing on a secular, rather than religious, moral standard will
allow, precisely, for society to have a moral compass that has no exemptions to an absolute
divinity’s categorical commands. This non-exemptionist approach would enable for a moral
standard to arise that doesn’t include the loophole issue we exposed – it won’t allow for
subjective undertakings that can be coherently justified if they are highly immoral. By erasing
the divine aspect within morality, we hope that it will allow for the possibility for harm causation
to decrease exponentially. Yet, this investigation must find itself in a different work. Here, we
conclude that that standard must not be Scriptural and must not allow for the loophole issue to
arise.

74

WORKS CITED
"2017 Hate Crime Statistics". FBI, 2021, https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2017/topicpages/incidents-and-offenses.
Alkimin, Maria Aparecida. "A Reflection On Domestic Violence Against Childrenand
Adolescents Before The Controversial Aspects And Gaps Of The Law 13.010, Of 26 June 2014
(Spanking Law)". Mpsp.Mp.Br, 2016,
http://www.mpsp.mp.br/portal/page/portal/documentacao_e_divulgacao/doc_biblioteca/bibli_ser
vicos_produtos/bibli_boletim/bibli_bol_2006/RTrib_n.964.14.PDF.
Atheist Community of Austin. “Another Attempt At Arguing The Morality Of Slavery |
Eddie-(CA) | The Atheist Experience 24.44.” YouTube, uploaded by The Atheist Experience, 1
Nov. 2020, www.youtube.com/watch?v=roFX1I-eOmA&t=136s.
Bagwell, Orlando and Sheila Bernard, directors. Eyes on the Prize . Eyes on the Prize Ain't Gonna Shuffle No More, PBS, www.facebook.com/watch/?v=333451777831560.
Bergmann, Michael et al. Divine Evil?. Oxford University Press, 2013.
Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy (Penguin Classics). Revised Edition, Penguin
Classics, 1999.
Bradley, Keith R, and Paul Cartledge. The Cambridge World History Of Slavery.
Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Broom, Zachary. Without God. 2019.
CartaCapital. “Casa 1: por que LGBTs precisam de uma república de acolhimento?”
CartaCapital, 15 Nov. 2016, www.cartacapital.com.br/sociedade/casa-1-por-que-lgbts-precisamde-uma-republica-de-acolhimento.

75

"Catholic Teaching On Apostolic Succession - International Theological
Commission". Vatican.Va, 1973,
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_cti_1973_succession
e-apostolica_en.html.
Cave, Alfred A. “Canaanites in a Promised Land: The American Indian and the Providential
Theory of Empire.” American Indian Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 4, 1988, pp. 277–297. JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/1184402.
Conner, Jonah David. All That's Wrong With The Bible. Independently Published, 2017.
Copan, Paul. Is God A Moral Monster?. Baker Books, 2011.
Copan, Paul, and Matthew Flannagan. Did God Really Command Genocide?. Baker
Books, 2015.
Dawkins, Richard. The God Delusion. 2006.
Drennan, William A. "Bob Jones University v. United States: For Whom Will the Bell
Toll." Saint Louis University Law Journal, vol. 29, no. 2, March 1985, p. 561-596. HeinOnline,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/stlulj29&i=577.
Feitosa, Adriano Brito, and Renato De Oliveira Macêdo. “Provérbios 29.15 e a Lei da
Palmada.” Jus.com.br, June 2017, jus.com.br/artigos/58567/proverbios-29-15-e-a-lei-dapalmada/3.
Gallup, Inc. “Three in Four in U.S. Still See the Bible as Word of God.” Gallup.Com, 4
June 2014, news.gallup.com/poll/170834/three-four-bible-word-god.aspx.
"Global Index of Religion and Atheism". Sidmennt.Is, 2012, https://sidmennt.is/wpcontent/uploads/Gallup-International-um-tr%C3%BA-og-tr%C3%BAleysi-2012.pdf.

76

Goodman, Micah, and Eylon Levy. Catch-67: The Left, the Right, and the Legacy of the SixDay War. Yale University Press, 2018. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv5cgbcq. Accessed 18 Apr.
2021.
Gottlieb, Alma. “Menstrual Taboos: Moving Beyond the Curse.” The Palgrave
Handbook of Critical Menstruation Studies, 1st ed. 2020, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, pp. 143–
62, doi:10.1007/978-981-15-0614-7_14.
Guterman, Mark, et al. “Menstrual Taboos Among Major Religions.” Internet Scientific
Publications, 31 Dec. 2007, ispub.com/IJWH/5/2/8213.
Hitchens, Christopher. God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything. Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 2007. Print.
Harris, Sam. Letter To A Christian Nation. Vintage, 2008.
Jones, Robert. White Too Long: The Legacy of White Supremacy in American
Christianity. Illustrated, Simon & Schuster, 2020.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr. Discourse on Metaphysics and Other Essays
(Hackett Classics). 9th ed., Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1991.
Leiter, Brian. Why Tolerate Religion?. 2012.
Longman, Timothy. “Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda.” Journal of Religion
in Africa, vol. 31, no. 2, 2001, pp. 163–86. Crossref, doi:10.1163/157006601x00112.
Mirus, Jeff. "The Catholic Approach To Scripture". Catholicculture.Org, 2011,
https://www.catholicculture.org/commentary/catholic-approach-to-scripture/.
Muñoz, Vincent Phillips. Religious Liberty And The American Supreme Court. 1st ed.,
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013.

77

Nascimento, Abdias. O Genocídio do Negro Brasileiro; Processo de um Racismo
Mascarado. Editora Perspectiva S.A., 2016.
“On the Inspiration of Scripture.” Newman Reader, Feb. 1884,
www.newmanreader.org/works/miscellaneous/scripture.html.
"Rape Statistics By Country 2021". Worldpopulationreview.Com, 2021,
https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/rape-statistics-by-country.
Schliesser, Christine. “From ‘a Theology of Genocide’ to a ‘Theology of
Reconciliation’? On the Role of Christian Churches in the Nexus of Religion and Genocide in
Rwanda.” Religions 9.2 (2018): 34. Crossref. Web.
Seip, Nick. "New Study Reveals The Scope Of Youth Homelessness". True Colors
United, 2017, https://truecolorsunited.org/2017/11/15/new-study-reveals-scope-youthhomelessness/.
Shermer, Michael. The Moral Arc. Griffin Publishing, 2016.
“Some Evangelicals Struggle With Black Lives Matter Movement.” Sojourners, 27 Jan.
2016, sojo.net/about-us/news/some-evangelicals-struggle-black-lives-matter-movement.
Taliaferro, Karen. The Possibility Of Religious Freedom. Cambridge University Press,
2020.
The Bible. English Standard Version, Crossway, 2016.
The Bible. New International Version, Biblica, Inc., 2011.
Toner, Patrick. "Infallibility." The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 7. New York: Robert
Appleton Company, 1910. 18 Apr. 2021 <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07790a.htm>.

78

